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ABSTRACT 
 
Thanks to the deepening of globalization, we live in an increasingly diverse 
world.  International migratory patterns bring people of different, often less familiar, 
cultures to other parts of the world, including the West.  For some, assimilation into a 
dominant culture and broader national identity seems appropriate; for others who want to 
preserve their unique identity, there is a struggle in accommodating to the new norms and 
behaviors of their host country.  This paper attempts to survey the challenges of 
multiculturalism; more specifically, it reviews the difficulty in integrating non-western 
norms into western culture.  As I will discuss in greater detail, I hypothesize that even 
though in some situations non-western culture seems threatening to western culture, this 
should not serve as a pretext for the abrogation for human rights, except when harm to 
self or society will result.  In order to defend my hypothesis, I will use the case of the 
headscarf – a controversial piece of cloth that has shaken up governments and societies 
throughout Europe.  Although it represents non-western culture in its mildest form, it has 
come to be perceived as threatening to the western principles of secularism and gender 
equality.  I will use the case studies of France and Turkey to examine the issue.  While 
both countries have overlapping but also varying reasons for finding the veil threatening, 
they have cited the separation of church and state as justification for banning the 
headscarf.  As no harm can be proven, this to me is an abrogation of human rights, 
including freedom of religious expression, the right to education and most importantly, 
the freedom to choose. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
In September 2010, two anonymous students took to the streets of Paris dressed in 
a waist-length niqab,1 mini-shorts and high heels.  As they sashayed through the city, 
they visited several government buildings, stopped traffic, waved to onlookers and posed 
to take pictures.  The edgy video that captured the attention-grabbing stunt, titled 
“Niqabitch,” was made by two women questioning the “unconstitutional” French ban on 
headscarves in public schools and government buildings.2  While the short video quickly 
became an internet sensation in Europe, varying interpretations of the video’s message 
have ranged from the imperialist exotification of the veil to the dehumanization of 
women to the rise of Islamophobia to freedom of choice.3  Regardless, the students made 
a bold political statement that illustrated the juxtaposition of East and West, covered and 
revealing, sacred and modern. 
Today, we live in a world that is increasingly focused on the spread of democracy 
and the value of individual liberty.  As a result, new issues arise that challenge the norms 
and behavior of individuals, states. and the international community.  As I write these 
words, schools in the Netherlands are caught in a deadlock about whether or not to ban 
the headscarf.  In January 2011, the Equal Treatment Commission responded to a case in 
Utrecht where 50 students objected to a new dress code that required 90 percent of their 
faces to be visible. They were prohibited from concealing their eyebrows or chin, as it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  niqab	  is	  a	  veil	  worn	  by	  Muslim	  women	  that	  covers	  the	  face,	  revealing	  only	  the	  eyes.	  2	  Niqabitch,	  “Minishort	  and	  Niqab	  stroll	  ‘niqabitch’	  in	  Paris”,	  Rue89,	  September	  30,	  2011,	  accessed	  March	  26,	  2011,	  	  http://www.rue89.com/2010/09/30/minishort-­‐et-­‐niqab-­‐balade-­‐provoc-­‐dans-­‐paris-­‐avant-­‐la-­‐loi-­‐168779.	  3	  Fatemeh,	  “Does	  NiqaBitch	  Enrich	  the	  Burqa	  Ban	  Debate?”,	  Muslimah	  Media	  Watch,	  October	  5,	  2011,	  accessed	  March	  26,	  2011,	  http://muslimahmediawatch.org/2010/10/do-­‐the-­‐niqabitches-­‐enrich-­‐the-­‐burqa-­‐ban-­‐debate/.	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was said to hinder communication between teachers and students. 4   The students 
complained that school officials used a ruler to ensure that they were abiding by the dress 
code.  Although its ruling was not legally binding, the Equal Treatment Commission 
backed the school, stressing the importance of communication and claiming that the rule 
applied to everyone and included a ban on hairstyles that cover the eyes.  In an earlier 
case, the Equal Treatment Commission cited religious discrimination when a college in 
Volendam banned the headscarf, as the school claimed that it conflicted with its Roman 
Catholic principles. 5  A local Dutch court upheld the ban.  Political parties are heavily 
divided on the issue as well, as they clash on whether the ban is justifiable and legitimate.  
One Dutch parliamentarian, Geert Wilders, proposed a headscarf tax, or rather, “Head 
Rag Tax,” in order to create a “better environment [since] many Dutch are irritated by the 
pollution of public space by Islam.”  He continued by saying that in order to reclaim the 
country (and rid the country of non-western immigrants that usurp state benefits), the 
Dutch must take action.  He stated: 
… Our streets in some places are increasingly looking like Mecca and Tehran. 
Scarves, hate-beards, burkas, men in long weird white frocks. Let us do 
something about that. Let us start to reconquer our streets, and ensure that the 
Netherlands will look like the Netherlands again. Those headscarves are a true 
sign of oppression of women, of subjugation, of conquest. It is a symbol of an 
ideology that is out there to colonize us. Therefore: it is time for a big spring-
cleaning of our streets. If our new Dutch citizens want so badly to show their love 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “School	  can	  restrict	  headscarf	  size,	  but	  only	  for	  new	  pupils,”	  DutchNews.nl,	  January	  25,	  2011,	  accessed	  October	  20,	  2011,	  http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2011/01/school_can_restrict_headscarf.php.	  5	  The	  most	  common	  form	  of	  head	  covering	  Muslim	  women	  don	  is	  the	  hijab,	  which	  covers	  the	  hair,	  and	  oftentimes	  ears	  and	  neck.	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for that seventh-century desert ideology, then they should rather comfortably do 
that in a Muslim country, but not here, not in our country.6 
While a more extreme example of a relevant political reaction, Wilders’ speech illustrates 
the intensity of the debate in the Netherlands. 
Now what is puzzling about the debate is that while the West stresses democracy 
and secularity, the debate has often veered from these political ideals.  One important 
western norm is that of individual and civil liberties, as put forth by philosopher John 
Stuart Mill, who claimed that in matters concerning oneself (where others are unharmed), 
an individual’s “independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign.”7  This includes the right to liberty of conscience, 
thought, feeling, and opinion, be it on any subject, “practical or speculative, scientific, 
moral, or theological”; liberty of tastes and pursuits, of lifestyle; and liberty to unite with 
others for any purpose, as long as it is with one’s own free will and does not harm 
others.8  This western notion of individualism limits the power of the state and society 
(“the majority”) by ensuring a person’s moral and economic freedom.  It stresses the 
individual’s choice to live life as he/she deems fit, without the influence and control of 
society or government.  It also ensures the safety and security one feels in freely 
expressing those choices, as he/she should be able to do so without undue pressure or 
harm to others. 
On a sociopolitical level, there is an important western tradition of separating the 
public and private realms.  According to Morton J. Horowitz, this distinction emerged in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “out of a double movement in modern political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Geert	  Wilders,	  General	  Debate	  -­‐	  Dutch	  Parliament,	  September	  18,	  2009,	  accessed	  October	  20,	  2011,	  http://www.geertwilders.nl/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1595.	  7	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  On	  Liberty,	  (Kitchener,	  Ontario:	  Batoche	  Books,	  2001),	  13.	  8	  Ibid.,	  15-­‐16.	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and legal thought… [these rights came about] for the purpose of setting limits on state   
power, both over property and religious conscience… [they] were not only efforts to 
incorporate into law what one writer has called a philosophy of ‘possessive  
individualism,’ but also to provide an important basis for arguing religious toleration.”9  
Many European governments emphasize secularism, a separation between church and 
state.  However, it appears that with increasing infiltration of non-western norms and a 
subsequent boost in multiculturalism, states struggle in dealing with the “other.”  The fact 
that secular countries are interjecting state (whether on a national or local level) policies 
into the private, religious sphere is perplexing. 
This paradox suggests that multiculturalism is in fact easier in theory than in 
practice.  It shows the difficulties states face in confronting the intersection between 
religion and politics, while maintaining respect and tolerance in a multicultural world.  
The assimilation of ethnic communities into the pre-existing order of western societies 
proves to be challenging.  Furthermore, as Samuel P. Huntington notes, 
The increased extent to which people throughout the world differentiate 
themselves along cultural lines means that conflicts between cultural groups are 
increasingly important; civilizations are the broadest cultural entities; hence, 
conflicts between groups from different civilizations become central to global 
politics.10 
The headscarf controversy serves as a microcosm for the broader issue on the 
international level -- the constant struggle between East and West, the clash of 
civilizations, and the challenges in achieving pluralist cultures in a diverse world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Morton	  J.	  Horowitz,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Public/Private	  Distinction,”	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  
Review	  130,	  no.	  6	  (1982):	  1423,	  accessed	  October	  20,	  2011,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3311976.	  10	  Samuel	  Huntington,	  The	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations	  and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  World	  Order	  (New	  York:	  Touchstone,	  1996),	  128.	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More specifically, this brings in questions about the acceptance of non-western 
customs in the West.  Are there certain norms that violate or threaten western culture in 
such a way as to support to the limitation of human rights?  Do these norms threaten the 
way of life for those living in the West in such a way as to rationalize certain state 
responses?  While these issues will be addressed in the next chapter, it is crucial to 
emphasize the importance of human rights in the discussion.  The headscarf debate does 
not only concern the way that norms and values influence state behavior, but also human 
(and women’s) rights.  Although I will discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 3, the 
headscarf serves as both a religious and/or cultural symbol.  In the grand scheme of 
international relations, the headscarf controversy can be linked to the inability of societies 
to reconcile religion and politics.  In my opinion, whether implemented by a theocracy or 
secularly-driven republic, policies such as those regarding the headscarf ultimately hinder 
an individual’s basic human rights – to personal expression, religious freedom and 
overall liberty.  It is thus highly relevant to study the question in today’s complex world, 
as well as in the discipline of international relations. 
In this paper, I will hypothesize that even though there are certain situations 
where non-western culture can be deemed threatening to the western way of life, this 
does not warrant the denial of human rights, except in situations where it will bring harm 
to self or others.  In the next chapter, I elaborate on this and other aspects of my research 
design. 
	   8	  
Chapter II: Research Design 
 
Hypothesis 
 For the purpose of this paper, I will question and test the following hypothesis: 
Even though under certain circumstances non-western culture can be seen as threatening 
to western culture, this should not serve as a pretext for the abrogation of human rights, 
except in situations where the non-western culture can bring harm to self or others. 
 It is important to note that while I will be focusing on integration problems with 
respect to western culture, a similar argument can be made with respect to western norms 
being accepted into non-western culture.  In many parts of the non-western world, there is 
a strong resistance to the spread of western culture and norms.  Responses to the spread 
of western culture can also lead to an abrogation of human rights – be it in the form of 
government policies opposing certain behavior or a negative societal response.   
However, in this paper, I will be focusing on the aforementioned argument, as it is related 
to the subject I will discuss later – the western response to a form of standard Islamic 
dress. 
 
Research Design 
In order to address this hypothesis, I will use the hijab not only to illustrate non-
western culture, but as a human rights issue.  Furthermore, I will use the case studies of 
France and Turkey to support my hypothesis.  While both countries cite secularism and 
the promotion of western ideals (such as democracy and gender equality) as reasons for 
the headscarf ban, they are unique cases.  In France, where women tend to wear the veil 
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for religious reasons, the ban impacts the idea of freedom of religion.  The French 
government is concerned with maintaining a separation of church and state and 
preserving a dominant French national identity.  The headscarf is defined as a probable 
threat to public order because it interferes with these founding French principles.  In 
Turkey the hijab is more of a political symbol and the ban is seen by many as abrogating 
the rights to personal expression and free thought.  The Turkish government also works 
to keep a secular, Turkish identity; however, the ban is also a reaction to the fear of non-
westernization and a return to the political Islam that existed during the Ottoman Empire, 
as well as parts of the non-western world today.  In both countries, the veil is perceived 
by authorities as threatening to western culture, but because there is little evidence to 
show that it is harmful to self or society, it is maintained in this paper that the ban should 
not serve as a pretext for the abrogation of human rights. 
In order to lay the foundation for my argument, it is first important to understand 
the conditions that lead to western culture not accepting non-western norms.  However, 
before doing so, I must clarify some concepts. 
 
Definitions 
Firstly, we must define culture.  Anthropologist Clifford Geertz is well-known for 
his study of culture.  In his work “The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays,” 
Geertz explains: “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it 
to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in 
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search of meaning… Culture is public because meaning is.”1  Culture is therefore “a 
historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life.” 2  
Furthermore, “understanding a people's culture exposes their normalness without 
reducing their particularity… It renders them accessible: setting them in the frame of 
their own banalities, it dissolves their opacity.”3  In other words, culture is the context in 
which people live.  Since he defines social structure as the “economic, political, and 
social relations among individuals and groups,”4 culture is not something to which we 
can attribute social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes.  It is not a force that 
causes the aforementioned, but rather the means by which we can observe people’s 
behavior. 
 Furthermore, according to anthropologist Jack David Eller, culture is an important 
political tool that is difficult to dispute, and therefore can serve as an asset. 
Culture is a group’s seal of authenticity and its warranty of worth, serving as a 
gloss, a badge, and a weapon for a party in the war of identity politics… [It] is a 
popular asset or weapon in contemporary politics because it is such a potent one.  
For one thing, claims on the basis of culture are difficult to defeat or contradict; 
any such attempt may be condemned as ‘racist,’ ‘elitist,’ ‘oppressive,’ or 
‘genocidal’ or given some other opprobrious label.  Injecting culture into the 
political debate gives it a moral tone on both sides, pitting fundamental realities 
and unimpeachable truths against each other.  And since there is no ‘cross-cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Clifford	  Geertz,	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Cultures:	  Selected	  Essays	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1973),	  5	  +	  12.	  2	  Ibid.,	  89.	  3	  Ibid.,	  14.	  4	  Ibid.,	  362.	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truth’ or standard, there is no way to verify – or more importantly, to falsify – a 
group’s claims.5 
Eller also maintains that while it is sometimes covertly or overtly suggested otherwise, 
there is no argument that one culture is better than another; “rather, cultures are merely 
different, which is supposedly neutral.”6  I will discuss the issues relating to integrating 
cultures shortly, when defining multiculturalism and assimilation, the latter often 
involving the adoption of cultural norms or values based on a perceived superiority. 
I will frequently use the terms western and non-western to describe a particular 
type of culture, composed of specific norms, values, political systems, social structures 
and/or beliefs.  Western culture emerged from European civilization, and includes norms 
such as those previously discussed – democracy, individualism and public/private 
distinction.  The term non-western is often associated with eastern culture, as it is 
prominent in Asia and the Middle East, as well as Africa.  While consisting of a range of 
subcultures, religions and philosophies, non-western culture has a strong emphasis on 
cooperation and community, over the individual. 
Cultural norms are the standards or expected behaviors of a particular society or 
group.  They are implicit or explicit rules that have been established over time to guide 
our interactions with others.  They shape our values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors, so 
much so that they “determine the meanings we attach to words.”7 
 Multiculturalism can be defined as a condition in which several distinct cultures 
coexist (e.g., within a state).  In ethnic studies concerning immigrants, assimilation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Jack	  David	  Eller,	  “Anti-­‐Anti-­‐Multiculturalism,”	  American	  Anthropologist	  99,	  no.	  2	  (1997):	  252,	  accessed	  November	  2,	  2011,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/682207.	  6	  Ibid.	  7	  Steven	  N.	  Durlauf	  and	  Lawrence	  E.	  Blume,	  “Social	  Norms,”	  in	  New	  Palgrave	  Dictionary	  of	  Economics,	  
Second	  Edition,	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  2008),	  accessed	  October	  31,	  2011,	  http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Young/PalgraveSocialNormsJuly07JHU.pdf	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acculturation have been recognized as distinct processes underlying multicultural 
adaptations. 8   Multiculturalism does not only refer to cultural diversity, but an 
environment in which cultures can thrive independently and also interact with each other 
in a respectful manner.  Multiculturalism serves as "a slogan and model for political 
action... emphasizing that acknowledging the existence of ethnic diversity and ensuring 
the rights of individuals to retain their culture should go hand in hand with enjoying full 
access to, participation in, and adherence to constitutional principles and commonly 
shared values prevailing in the society."9 
Multiculturalism is an official government policy for many western countries.  It 
was initially adopted by Canada in 1971 and even today, the Canadian government 
website describes multiculturalism as the following: 
As fact, ‘multiculturalism’ in Canada refers to the presence and persistence of 
diverse racial and ethnic minorities who define themselves as different and who 
wish to remain so. Ideologically, multiculturalism consists of a relatively coherent 
set of ideas and ideals pertaining to the celebration of Canada’s cultural mosaic. 
Multiculturalism at the policy level is structured around the management of 
diversity through formal initiatives in the federal, provincial and municipal 
domains. Finally, multiculturalism is the process by which racial and ethnic 
minorities compete with central authorities for achievement of certain goals and 
aspirations.10 
Since its inception, many countries, including most member-states of the European 
Union, have adopted multiculturalism as a policy.  However in more recent times, many 
European countries have struggled in dealing with multicultural policies and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Henry	  Pratt,	  Ethno-­‐Religious	  Politics	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Schenkman,	  1974).	  9	  Christine	  Inglis,	  “Multiculturalism:	  New	  Policy	  Responses	  to	  Diversity,”	  MOST	  Policy	  Papers	  4	  (Paris:	  UNESCO,	  1996):	  16,	  accessed	  November	  7,	  2011,	  http://www.unesco.org/most/pp4.htm.	  10	  Michael	  Dewing,	  “Canadian	  Multiculturalism,”	  Library	  of	  Parliament,	  September	  15,	  2009.	  Accessed	  November	  2,	  2011,	  http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0920-­‐e.htm.	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immigration.  Some states, including the Netherlands and Denmark, have altogether 
rejected multiculturalism as a policy. 
 Some anti-multiculturalists are opposed to the celebration of cultural differences, as 
“the emphasis on differences over commonalities accentuates or even creates differences 
and undermines shared knowledge and values.”11  Instead, they may prefer assimilation, 
where the ethnic minorities assimilate into the more dominant group, or cultural 
pluralism, where the smaller ethnic groups maintain their cultural identities, but 
participate fully in the dominant society.  Multiculturalism differs from assimilation and 
pluralism in that it does not necessarily involve a dominant culture.  Assimilation is a 
two-way process, where norms and values are adopted through language and 
communication, but it usually involves the minority community taking on the customs of 
the dominant culture.  Assimilation occurred in America throughout the 19th and early 
20th century, when Europeans migrated to the United States to create a “melting pot”; 
assimilationists believe that “cultural differences are a reality in American society, and 
individuals are autonomous agents in the social field but are determined as members of 
particular groups within the greater American polity.”12  More recently, since the 1960s, 
there has been a shift in attitude as the United States has moved away from assimilation 
to the belief that individuals should not abandon their distinct identities and attributes.  
Thus, scholars and political activists embraced multiculturalism and diversity.  
“Multiculturalism, in the context of the ‘American mosaic,’ celebrates the unique cultural 
heritage of racial and ethnic groups, some of whom seek to preserve their native 
languages and lifestyles. In a sense, individuals can be Americans and at the same time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Eller,	  “Anti-­‐Anti-­‐Multiculturalism,”	  250.	  12	  Ibid.	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claim other identities, including those based on racial and ethnic heritage, gender, and 
sexual preference.”13 
 Lastly, social integration is the “functional and effective link between a system's 
different agents or components.”  It can not only be positive, in that internal solidarity 
stimulates cooperation, social control and possibly subordination to group norms, but 
negative in cases where internal solidarity leads to animosity towards the external (e.g. 
xenophobia).14  
 Now that we have defined some basic terms, I will attempt to provide a framework 
within which we can begin to understand the issue.   
 
Problems 
Firstly, there are certain conditions that can lead to western cultures not accepting 
aspects of non-western culture.  When adherents of non-western culture attempt to 
integrate into western culture, proponents of the latter may seek to protect and preserve 
the existing cultural norms.  If non-western culture harms or violates the tenets of western 
culture in any way, westerners may react with intolerance.  Foreign norms can be 
unwelcome as they can harm the social fabric of a certain group; they can disrupt the 
social structures that have been established and for some westerners, may hinder 
progress.  For example, a non-western belief may be interpreted as oppressive when 
viewed through a western lens.  The promotion of such beliefs would directly violate the 
ideals of democracy and liberty. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Diana	  Owen,	  “American	  Identity,	  Citizenship,	  and	  Multiculturalism”	  (White	  Paper,	  Georgetown	  University,	  2005).	  14	  Steven	  Dijkstra,	  Karin	  Geuijen	  and	  Arie	  de	  Ruijter,	  “Multiculturalism	  and	  Social	  Integration	  in	  Europe,”	  International	  Political	  Science	  Review	  22,	  no.	  1	  (2001):	  55-­‐56,	  accessed	  November	  2,	  2011,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601285.	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I must take this opportunity to reiterate that this course of events can occur in 
non-western countries as well.  Throughout the course of history, there have been a 
multitude of cases where the spread of western norms was shunned, resulting in 
government policies that similarly abrogated human rights.  For example, in 1979, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rose to power after successfully leading the Iranian 
Revolution and overthrowing Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran.  In establishing 
a strict Islamic government, Khomeini segregated the sexes, created an Islamic education 
curriculum at all levels, enforced a strict dress code, prohibited western movies and 
banned music.  Khomeini rejected the notion of westernization and advocated Islamic 
revivalism as a state policy.  In doing so, he denied the Iranian citizens the freedom to 
express themselves freely or practice religion as they deemed (or did not deem) fit.  
Similar cases exist throughout time, but for this paper, I will focus on the integration of 
non-western norms into western culture. 
More specifically, nationalism can prove to be disruptive in achieving 
multiculturalism.    Through a sense of common values (and imagined communities15), 
members of a nation share citizenship and thus, a “national culture.”  Via communication, 
language and the media, a national culture is created that could be used as a political 
tool.16  “National consciousness in this sense consists of an overriding identification of 
the individual with a culture that is protected by the state.”17  Citizens who are members 
of the nation gain equal rights through membership; “anyone who wishes to have equal 
rights within a certain state must therefore also be equal to all others in that state: citizens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  concept	  of	  “imagined	  communities”	  (Benedict	  Anderson)	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  later	  in	  the	  chapter	  (p.	  23).	  16	  Dijkstra,	  Geuijen	  and	  de	  Ruijter,	  “Multiculturalism	  and	  Social	  Integration	  in	  Europe,”	  57.	  17	  Deidre	  M.	  Curtin,	  Postnational	  Democracy:	  The	  European	  Union	  in	  Search	  of	  a	  Political	  Philosophy	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  1997),	  14.	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must have the same identity.  The deal of equality is thus linked to possession of a 
cultural – and in this case national – identity.”18 
In Representative Government, John Stuart Mill speaks about the problems that 
can occur in the shaping of a national identity, especially when concerning a state in 
which the citizens speak and read different languages.  He first gives the following 
explanation of nationalism: 
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united 
among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and 
any others — which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than 
with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it 
should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This 
feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is 
the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and 
community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its 
causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession 
of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride 
and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the 
past.19 
Problems arise, however, in that it is impossible to have a single national identity in a 
multicultural world. 
Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case 
for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a 
government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of 
government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any 
division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of 
the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate 
themselves.  But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Dijkstra,	  Geuijen	  and	  de	  Ruijter,	  “Multiculturalism	  and	  Social	  Integration	  in	  Europe,”	  57.	  19	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  Representative	  Government	  (Kitchener,	  Ontario:	  Batoche	  Books,	  2001),	  181.	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vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up 
of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if 
they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to 
the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which 
form opinions and decide political acts are different in the different sections of the 
country. An altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of one part of 
the country and of another. The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do 
not reach them. One section does not know what opinions, or what instigations, 
are circulating in another. The same incidents, the same acts, the same system of 
government, affect them in different ways; and each fears more injury to itself 
from the other nationalities than from the common arbiter, the state. Their mutual 
antipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the government. That any 
one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the common ruler is sufficient to 
determine another to support that policy. Even if all are aggrieved, none feel that 
they can rely on the others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is 
sufficient to resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it consults its own 
advantage most by bidding for the favor of the government against the rest.20 
An overarching national identity creates separation, as not all citizens identify with it.  
“Nationalist ideologies tend to define their groups in either/or terms.  They conceptualize 
the nation as strictly bounded between insiders and outsiders, and seek to define attributes 
of national identity or character that all members share… Claiming such an essence for 
the nation sometimes oppresses individuals within who do not conform to these national 
norms, and sometimes oppresses outsiders against whom national members set 
themselves in opposition.”21  Furthermore, nationalism aims to “’purge’ the culture of its 
impure or foreign elements and thus render it whole again”… and attempts to “create 
forced unity out of diversity, coherence out of inconsistencies, and homogeneity out of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid.,	  182-­‐183.	  21	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Inclusion	  for	  Democracy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  252.	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narrative dissonance.”22  This divide can further impact those following “other” norms, as 
“the nation is conceived not merely in terms of horizontal ties to fellow-members, past 
and present, who share whatever features are taken to constitute the common identity, but 
in terms of vertical ties to established institutions, which are regarded as authoritative.”23  
It serves as an impediment to access to these institutions, which create policies that are in 
line with the national agenda. 
 For many non-westerners who migrate to the west, legal inequality and denial of 
their identity are consequences of national citizenship, thus making social integration 
increasingly difficult.24  Identities of immigrants are shaped not only by their host 
countries, but also their home countries.  As groups and boundaries are shaped through 
social and political processes, “ethnic identity is not an essence that people bear within 
themselves.  It is a social construction within a certain historical context.” 25  
Globalization has contributed to the formation of identities, as it allows the “free 
movement of cultural forms and images.”26  Through this process, many people are able 
to “revert to what they see as their own ethnic identity; they invoke traditions and a 
history which they sometimes manipulate to promote individual and group interests. In 
other words, increasing globalization fosters favorable conditions for all sorts of 
particularization, localization and even fragmentation.” 27   These newly formed 
transnational identities are shaped by a variety of processes.  However, these ethnically-
based identities can clash with national identities, making multiculturalism difficult.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  The	  Claims	  of	  Culture:	  Equality	  and	  Diversity	  in	  the	  Global	  Era	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  8.	  23	  David	  Miller,	  On	  Nationality	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press:	  1995),	  124.	  24	  Dijkstra,	  Geuijen	  and	  de	  Ruijter,	  “Multiculturalism	  and	  Social	  Integration	  in	  Europe,”	  75.	  25	  Ibid.,	  70.	  26	  Ibid.,	  58.	  27	  Ibid.	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While national identity binds citizens together, it is not always accommodating to cultural 
diversity. 
Thus, such issues can cause serious problems for social integration, assimilation 
and multiculturalism.  According to Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of a World Order, the post-Cold War era is and will continue to be plagued 
with cultural conflict.  While referring primarily to the West and East (“the peoples of 
Western Christianity, on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the 
other”),28 he explains that rather than ideological or economic conflict, the main source of 
contention in today’s world will be cultural.  This clash of civilizations is due to the 
inherent differences between groups, such as philosophical assumptions, underlying 
values, social relations, customs and overall outlooks on life.29  This cultural divide is 
difficult to reconcile and can greatly affect state policies and behavior, especially since 
the dominant group and interests “will hold power and shape the production and 
reproduction of society in such domains as education, government, institutions, and 
art.”30 
With regard to the West, multiculturalists worry about the Eurocentricity 
surrounding important cultural domains.  They “express the problem as a ‘centering’ of 
intellectual and cultural attention on European or European-derived elements”31 while 
“the rest of us are pushed to the periphery, occupying the restricted category of ‘other.’”32  
As this divide creates a “we” versus “they” mentality, it can lead to various forms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Huntington,	  The	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations,	  28.	  29	  Ibid.,	  28.	  30	  Eller,	  “Anti-­‐Anti-­‐Multiculturalism,”	  251.	  31	  Ibid.,	  249	  32	  Bernice	  Johnson	  Reagan,	  “’Battle	  Stancing’:	  To	  Do	  Cultural	  Work	  in	  America,”	  in	  Voices	  from	  the	  
Battlefront:	  Achieving	  Cultural	  Equity,	  eds.	  Marta	  Morena	  Vega	  and	  Cheryll	  Greene	  (Trenton,	  NJ:	  Africa	  World	  Press,	  1993),	  71.	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intolerance, exclusion, and xenophobia.  While non-westerners are members of western 
society, their differing norms in the context of a national identity do not always allow full 
immersion unless they assimilate. 
More specifically, this intolerance can lead to human rights violations.  By not 
allowing the free practice of non-western cultural norms, a host country can consequently 
deny human rights.  As the world becomes increasingly multicultural, there is a growth 
and spread of norms.  By not allowing ethnic communities to live according to their own 
set of norms, there is a denial of freedom, be it of thought, personal expression or 
religion.  Furthermore, “excluded groups develop negative self-images and ‘low self-
esteem’ and are therefore less likely to succeed in education and occupations.”33 
When discussing human rights, we must discuss the issue of universality versus 
cultural relativism.  In societies and communities with cultural sensitivities, it may seem 
difficult to apply a universal code to an entire population that has culture, religion and 
tradition embedded into its very foundation.  The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 
1948, sets forth a global standard for human rights.  It states, “all human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”34  The Declaration established 
a foundation and global standard for all human beings, regardless of race, color, gender, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, language, or property 
throughout the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Eller,	  “Anti-­‐Anti-­‐Multiculturalism,”	  249	  34	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1948),	  Article	  1	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Some critics of universality argue that human rights are drawn from traditional 
Western sources and that these are inadequate for dealing with multiculturalism.  “The 
underlying reasons for their inadequacy are traced back to a deeply rooted belief in the 
presumed universality of Western moral notions.  These assumptions manifest 
themselves in some of the international human rights documents.  It is clear from even 
the most cursory study of other cultures that their value systems differ from those of the 
West in significant ways.”35  This leaves a grey area where human rights questions 
pertaining to non-western norms are difficult to address. 
With regard to specific cultures, it is essential for a state to maintain a balance 
where it is both sensitive to cultural differences and still respectful of the individual’s 
inherent rights to freedom of religion and expression.  In thinking about the importance 
of cultural relativism, Weston notes, as  “there are no overarching moral truths… local 
customs and traditions therefore fundamentally determine the existence and scope of 
rights in any given society.”36  There is a cross-cultural challenge in respecting human 
rights.  The cultural rights of a group must be protected and the state should also not be 
ethno-centric and/or generalize a community’s existence.  To do so can degrade a 
culture’s identity.37 
Naturally, there are fundamental differences between western and non-western 
perspectives on human dignity.  In the western approach, there is a much greater 
emphasis on individualism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Allison	  Dundes	  Renteln,“The	  Concept	  of	  Human	  Rights,”	  Anthropos	  83,	  no.	  4/6	  (1988):	  343,	  accessed	  November	  2,	  2011.	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/40463371.	  36	  Burns	  H.	  Weston,	  "The	  Universality	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  a	  Multicultural	  World,"	  in	  Human	  Rights	  in	  
the	  World	  Community:	  Issues	  and	  Action,	  3rd	  ed.,	  ed.	  Richard	  Pierre	  Claude	  and	  Burns	  H.	  Weston,	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2006),	  40.	  37	  Stephen	  Hansen,	  "The	  Right	  to	  Take	  Part	  in	  Cultural	  Life,"	  in	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  World	  
Community:	  Issues	  and	  Action,	  3rd	  ed.,	  ed.	  Richard	  Pierre	  Claude	  and	  Burns	  H.	  Weston,	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2006),	  227.	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Rights held by individuals will of course tend to be more individualistic in their 
operation and effects than group rights or substantively similar non-rights 
protections because of the special claims justified by rights-based entitlements 
and the substantial discretionary control of the right-holder. When these rights are 
at the basic level of human rights, this individualism will be accented by the rarity 
of the social claims that will justifiably override rights.38 
While in western culture the individual is the focus of human rights, in non-western 
culture, community rights may take priority.   This can include the diminution of 
individual rights for the greater good of the community. 
In sum, one must find a middle ground between being culturally sensitive and 
understanding the basic concepts of morality and human rights.  As there are expected 
differences in perceptions of cultural values and norms, cross-cultural legitimacy is a 
fundamental aspect of progress and change.  It must be attained “so that peoples of 
diverse cultural traditions can agree in the meaning, scope, and methods of implementing 
these rights.”39 
In today’s world, it is increasingly intolerable to take away people’s rights; doing 
so catches global attention as there are now international humanitarian standards for 
tolerance and the respect for human rights.  “Treaties on human rights and other issues 
have great consequences for the possibility of bringing national states into line or 
intervening in each other’s affairs.  There is a growing sense that states should be unable 
to do everything to their citizens that they would like to, and that the international 
community has a responsibility to address human rights issues, even when states call 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Jack	  Donnelly,	  “Human	  Rights	  and	  Human	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  Non-­‐Western	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  of	  Human	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  no.	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  (1982):	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  accessed	  November	  2,	  2011,	  	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1961111.	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  to	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  in	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  Rights	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  ed.	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  University	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  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  1992),	  21.	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them ‘internal affairs.’”40  States that violate human rights are heavily scrutinized by 
international organizations (e.g., the United Nations), transnational nongovernmental 
organizations, and the international community.  Additionally, the abrogation of rights 
divides societies, rather than bringing them together.  In the process of attempting to 
assimilate a smaller culture with a larger one, a greater cultural divide is created and new 
problems surface. 
 
International Relations Theory 
Certain international relations frameworks are crucial for highlighting these 
issues.  Liberal theorists, for one, are greatly concerned with the spread of democracy and 
the protection of human rights.  As mentioned earlier, democratic ideals are a strong 
component of western culture.  Democracy is a highly valued commodity; when 
threatened, it is both reaffirmed and enforced by western advocates.  It is often listed as a 
reason for many of the West’s policies and attitudes. 
Furthermore, the defense of human rights is also integral to liberal theory.  As we 
discussed earlier in the chapter, when certain western norms are violated, there can be a 
subsequent abrogation of human rights.  Liberalism highlights the importance of 
protecting fundamental human rights, as it is conducive to creating a democratic society. 
 With regard to nationalism, Benedict Anderson discusses the way in which a 
nation is socially constructed.  Taking from Marxism, in Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, he explains that a nation is “an 
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imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”41  
It is imagined because even though the members will never know each other, “in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion.”42  A nation is limited by its 
boundaries, and sovereign because it is free to rule itself without a dynastic monarchy 
claiming authority.  Lastly, it is a community because “regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the 
past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die 
for such limited imaginings.”43  While members of a nation may not ever meet each 
other, they imagine they are bonded by shared interests, attitudes and opinions as they 
identify with the same nation.  Stemming from a common nationality, the imagined 
community helps shape political and cultural institutions.  With regard to achieving 
multiculturalism, the imagined communities that exist in countries can be problematic.  In 
western nations, nationalism can promote a monocultural approach or beliefs; doing so 
can stifle and hinder the growth of non-western norms. 
 Constructivism is another useful international relations framework, as it helps us 
to understand the role of identity – the way it is created and how it ultimately impacts the 
actor’s behavior, be it of a state, group or individual.  Constructivism places a great deal 
of emphasis on values, culture and identities, as they ultimately shape international 
politics.  These identities are created by non-material structures that are normative and 
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ideational, and are driven by mechanisms such as imagination and communication.44  
These structures, consisting of institutionalized norms and ideas, lay the foundation for 
interests, and “it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the 
relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and 
interest”.45  It is safe to say that western and non-western culture are driven by their 
respective identities, comprised of their various norms and values. 
 Furthermore, identities are the basis of interests,46 be it those of the individual or 
the state, and therefore ultimately affect the actor’s behavior.  Even within a state or 
society, clashing western and non-western identities can create internal strife and tension.  
As each community struggles to maintain its identity, peaceful coexistence within 
existing boundaries becomes increasingly difficult.  Identities thus bond together to create 
an interest in ethnic solidarity and the preservation of cultural norms.  Whether the 
identities manifest into the individual’s self-interest or the state’s, the resulting behavior 
ultimately shapes large-scale policies and outcomes.  Furthermore, “both local identity 
and culture are crucial influences on the interpretation and creation of rules by agents.  
The analysis of norms and rules in world politics reveals that they reflect national, ethnic, 
religious, and other identities, brought to bear on social processes by particular 
cultures.”47  Both European and international politics are heavily influenced by these 
cultural identities.  We can apply constructivism by following the progress from 
norms/ideas/identities to interests and subsequently, behavior. 	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Global Policies 
With regard to the policy literature, international organizations have generally 
taken a backseat when it comes to multiculturalism and the integration of non-western 
norms into western culture.  The European Union and subsequently, Europe, have been 
openly condemned by critics for their failure to promote multiculturalism and tolerance.  
On its website, the European Commission (the executive body of the European Union) 
states that it has funded research programs in order to study intercultural dialogue.  One 
such program, entitled EMILIE, is an interdisciplinary project that serves as “a response 
to the current ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ and the lack of a common EU intellectual 
framework to discuss the relevant challenges.”  It conducted a study of migration in nine 
European countries – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Poland, 
Spain and UK – in order to understand the relevant issues, challenges and conflicts.  In 
doing so, EMILIE aims to “identify the European dimensions of integrating diversity 
(value discourses, points of tension, best practices) and elaborates an empirically 
grounded European theoretical model of multiculturalism appropriate to the European 
experience and the current crisis as a basis for a rational resolution of the current panic 
about multiculturalism.”48 
As the United Nations is focused on international peace, development and human 
rights, multiculturalism is part of its agenda as well.  A press release from a September 
2005 General Assembly meeting stresses the importance of multiculturalism, noting, 
“acceptance of and commitment to multiculturalism was at the heart of the global fight 
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against discrimination and xenophobia.”49  The committee stressed the need for the 
international community to promote multiculturalism in order to fight increasing racism 
and racial discrimination in our pluralistic world, specifically with regard to the Muslim 
community.  The year prior, a UN-Habitat report examined the economic and social 
imbalances caused by the discrimination of migrants.  Multiculturalism is “an urban 
phenomenon that should be celebrated, not feared… [It] enhances the fabric of 
societies… brings color and vibrancy to every city it touches… [and] has the potential to 
broaden the cultural and ethnic dimensions of cities.”50  The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has a program that focuses specifically 
on international migration.  The aim of the program is to “promote the respect for the 
human rights of migrants, and to contribute to peaceful integration of migrants in 
society.”51  Furthermore, in July 2003, The International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families52 entered into force.  
While it has yet to be signed and ratified by all member states, the convention addresses 
various human rights for migrants such as the right to basic freedom, privacy, 
information, equality, due process and so on. 
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While these two major international organizations, the European Union and 
United Nations, address issues related to integration, their scope and reach appear to be 
limited.  As mentioned, the United Nations does set forth global standards for human 
rights, via various instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
While this is vital for the establishment, maintenance, and enforcement of human rights 
norms, there is certainly a lack of attention given to assimilation and multiculturalism.  
The United Nations and European Union certainly facilitate important dialogue and 
awareness; however, there is minimal literature and even less guidance regarding how 
states should welcome multiculturalism. 
Since we have now discussed the integration of non-western norms into western 
culture, we have laid the foundation for the issue at hand.  In order to continue my 
analysis, I will examine the headscarf controversy, as it is central to Islamic culture and 
illustrates the way in which the “other” culture is (or is not) tolerated in the West.  In the 
following two chapters, I will discuss the headscarf at length, and then use the case 
studies of France and Turkey to test my hypothesis. 
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Chapter III: The Significance of the Headscarf 
 
As mentioned earlier, I have chosen the headscarf to represent both non-western 
culture as well as a human rights issue.  In today’s world, Islam and its culture are widely 
scrutinized given the current political climate. 
 
Background 
On September 11th 2001, Muslim terrorist group Al-Qaeda launched a brutal 
attack on United States soil that would not only impact the lives of American citizens, but 
the international community at large.  That morning, 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four 
commercial airplanes and targeted United States buildings, successfully hitting the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon.  In less than a two-hour span, 3,000 civilians had 
perished.  The world was shocked by the series of vicious attacks and immediately set out 
a counterterrorism agenda to try and ensure that nothing of this magnitude would ever 
happen again. 
The Bush administration immediately responded to the attacks, which were 
classified as a crime against humanity1 in that they blatantly violated international human 
rights and humanitarian law.  The “War on Terror” would impact not only American 
rhetoric, but foreign and domestic laws, policies and even societal norms.  Furthermore, 
the catastrophic and tragic events of 9/11 created not only a curious fascination, but also a 
lingering fear of this previously little-known non-western religion with its mystifying 
cultural practices. 
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In the wake of September 11th, the global community has been increasingly 
confronted with Islamic culture and has struggled to understand it.  While, like any 
culture, Islam contains its own values, norms and practices, Muslim dress is a more 
visible form of culture that is prevalent in western society.  The events of 9/11 certainly 
brought the headscarf debate to the forefront.  Although Islamic garb varies greatly in 
how much and in what way it covers an individual, I have chosen the headscarf as it is 
Islamic wear in its mildest and most widely used form. 
The veil is worn frequently throughout the western (and of course, non-western) 
world by girls and women of all ages.  While historians have traced its origins back to 
pre-Islamic Persia (as a symbol of class distinction), the headscarf has evolved through 
time and has maintained a subjective meaning for both wearer and observer.  The hijab is 
said to have originated in the Ancient Near East, where elite Assyrian and Babylonian 
women wore the headscarf.  It was the right of free women to don it and slaves who did 
so could be punished.2  Today, the way Muslim women wear the headscarf varies greatly 
according to different cultures and individuals, but for the purposes of this paper, I will 
refer mainly to the hijab, which covers the hair (and neck, for the most part), as it the 
most commonly worn head covering.  The importance of hijab is that while one may 
view it as a simple piece of cloth, it is heavily loaded with meaning – socially, culturally 
and politically. 
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Religious Meanings 
From an Islamic perspective, the veil is viewed as a symbol of honor and purity.  
As the body represents sexuality and femininity, the hijab portrays modesty, as well as 
Islamic morality and values, such as piety and honor.  Different Islamic scholars have 
varying interpretations on whether the hijab is obligatory.  One verse that suggests the 
wearing of a headscarf says: “O prophet, say to thy wives, and the daughters, and the 
womenfolk of the believers, that they let down some (part) of their mantles over them; 
that is more suitable for their being recognized and not insulted.”3 Another Quranic verse 
that most directly speaks to veiling reads: 
… and tell the believing women to lower their gaze and to be mindful of their 
chastity, and not to display their charms [in public] beyond what may be 
apparent thereof; hence, let them draw their head-coverings over their bosoms 
and not show or display their charms except to their husbands or their fathers or 
the fathers of their husbands, or their sons or the sons of their husbands, or their 
brothers, or the sons of their sisters, or their womenfolk, or those in their 
possession...4 
While some scholars believe that covering the head is not mandatory, others feel 
everything, including the hands and face, should be concealed.  Despite the wavering 
scholarly opinions on the topic, it is safe to say that throughout the Muslim world, the 
hijab is not a mere piece of cloth; its significance is much deeper than that, as it is 
universally representative of modesty, piety and respect. 
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Alternate Meanings 
The hijab is an integral part of a Muslim woman’s identity, self-expression and 
personal empowerment.  In the 20th century, unveiling (and in some cases, veiling) has 
served as a political statement.  Elite Egyptian women abandoned the headscarf in direct 
challenge to their class-based marginalization in society in the 1920s.  Muslim 
Palestinian women also unveiled in rebellion to Hamas’ nationalization of the hijab in 
order to enforce patriotism and respect during the intifada (1990s). 
In other cases, women have donned the veil for political reasons.  During the 
Algerian War (1954-1962), women wore the headscarf as a resistance to French 
colonialism and a symbol of national liberation.  In 1970s post-revolutionary Iran, 
women wore the hijab in defiance of the modernizing Shah’s regime and western cultural 
imperialism.  Furthermore, the Islamic revivalism that began in the Middle East in the 
1970s (and continues today) created a transnational, universal Islamic identity.  As 
Muslims around the world embraced Islamic culture (in opposition to Westernization), 
they created a global collective of shared values, culture and lifestyle.   They began to 
turn to Islam “as a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, 
and hope, hope epitomized in the slogan ‘Islam is the solution.’”5  Furthermore, the 
movement serves as an “expression of modernity… the emphasis upon Islamic values is 
not intended as a return to some past era but represents an effort to cope with 
contemporary problems by renewed commitment to the basic principles, though not the 
historical details, of Islam.”6  Veiling is a strong component of the contemporary Islamic 
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revival, as women veil not only to display their Islamic identity, but also to foster 
solidarity and create a transnational community in the face of today’s intolerance and 
oppression.  In such cases, veiling may serve as “a collective means of asserting cultural 
authenticity in the face of a dominant cultural model seeking to extinguish Islamically 
inspired social mores.”7  In challenge to cultural assimilation, veiling for political reasons 
can emphasize a unique cultural identity. 
Since 9/11, even more new political meanings have emerged as Muslim women 
are observed with greater scrutiny in the United States; some women donning the hijab 
have been attacked, as they are “marked by their dress as representative of the Enemy and 
inferior Muslim Other.”8  For them, “simply taking on a negatively charged garment in 
[American] society is an act of courageous defiance in the face of prejudice.”9  As a 
response to the attacks, non-Muslim activists across the United States declared “headscarf 
days” and wore the hijab to show their solidarity with women who were at risk because 
of their clothing.  For some women in the post-9/11 years, wearing the headscarf became 
an act of commitment and defiance.  It evolved to become a symbol of solidarity for 
women throughout the country. 
On a social level, feminists view veiling as granting women autonomy and 
equality articulated in terms totally different from the language of the West.10  Wearing a 
hijab enables many women, who may otherwise feel uncomfortable and restricted, “to 
assert their presence in male space by setting unavoidable contacts with non-kin males 	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within a desexualized context.”11  For women who identify with the Islamic norm of the 
headscarf, the veil serves as a mechanism for female empowerment as it enhances 
mobility and freedom within the public space; it can also act as protection from unwanted 
attention.  Furthermore, Muslim women may find it difficult to adopt a western model of 
feminism as they do not necessarily recognize family ties and kinship as a hindrance to 
women’s liberation; they also may resent the West’s identification of “the problem” of 
Muslim women as a religious problem.12  Judging the status and roles of Muslim women 
in western cultural terms can lead to negative or biased interpretations of an Islamic 
lifestyle. 
It is safe to say that for some women donning the hijab is a religious choice, but 
for many others it is cultural one devoid of religious significance, whether grounded in 
community, politics, identity, ethnicity, or tradition.  For some women, it is both. 
 
Western Perceptions 
It is also important to note the general western perception of the hijab that lays the 
foundation, both historically and currently, for the West’s beliefs, actions, and policies.  
For many, the headscarf is an archaic and backwards practice that is frequently forced 
upon a woman.  The veil acts as a “ potent symbol of gender, political, and social 
inequality.”13  It is seen as segregating the sexes with social margins, as it symbolizes a 
woman’s confinement to her private sphere and the limitation of her movement in the 
public space.  As a result, it is often deemed an oppressive practice that keeps women in a 	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perpetual state of subordination.  Sociologist Juliette Minces, for example, describes the 
veil as an “everyday form of oppression”, stating: 
the veil is today a political symbol, whose meaning goes much farther, since it 
affects women alone and reduces them once again to sexual objects -- inferior, 
unclean and dangerous.  For whether one likes it or not, the veil is the hallmark of 
the image men have of women (it is very often men who put pressure on women 
to wear the veil again, on the pretext of religious observance) and, consequently, 
of what they have internalized with regard to it.14 
Like many in the West, Minces feels there are deeply-embedded ideas of subjugation, 
oppression and patriarchy associated with the hijab. 
A great deal of this perspective is based on deeply-rooted colonial perceptions by 
western imperialists of Muslim women wearing the headscarf in Islamic countries.  “The 
prejudices [that are] generally associated with earlier western travellers to the Muslim 
world – who imagined native women as either ignorant heathens, or exotic beings whose 
allures were tantalizingly hidden by layers of clothing – largely continue to color 
contemporary western perceptions of Muslim women.” 15   These colonial attitudes 
towards Islamic culture were marked with notions of civilized/uncivilized, 
colonizer/colonized, and European/non-European.16  This charged perception of veiling 
has been upheld throughout the years. 
It is also important to note that men’s religious attire does not evoke a similar 
western response, which “suggests that women’s adoption of religious clothing is taken 
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to be a sign of social coercion in a way that men’s wearing of religiously symbolic 
clothing is not.”17 
 In sum, Leila Ahmed says it best: 
Human dress is all about symbolism and about signaling different and sometimes 
contradictory (whether deliberately or otherwise) meanings.  The veil is only 
different - and also therefore infinitely more charged than most clothing - in its 
potential meanings, meanings which of course may be quite different for wearer 
and observer. Because of the historical meanings with which it has been imbued 
since the rise of European imperialism, it has the power, perhaps uniquely as a 
garment, to provoke, disturb unsettle.  For over a hundred years now it has served 
as perhaps the quintessential symbol and flag of civilization clash, of clashing 
values, and of struggles between the powers of empire and those resisting 
imperial powers, and an emblem too of clashing classes and of the struggle 
between the haves and have-nots within a society.18 
The varying interpretations of the veil have played a major role in the current debate 
surrounding the hijab.  A religious garment has become a controversial component of 
domestic policy in several countries.  Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran 
have enforced the headscarf for all women, while France, Germany and the Netherlands 
have banned the hijab in certain public spaces.  In Turkey, the veil has been a source of 
contention for the past 30 years.  As mentioned earlier, in the wake of 9/11, the issue has 
become even more prominent, amidst a growing focus on Islam and its adherents. 
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Veiling 
 In Muslim countries where hijab is enforced, Islamic law, Sharia, is an integral 
part of the ruling and legal systems.  Failure to comply is a punishable act, with 
consequences ranging from fines to lashes to imprisonment.  In Iran, veiling is 
compulsory -- even for foreign visitors.  With the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran in 1979 came a new set of rules for women and their respective ethical behavior in 
the public sphere.  Not only were they be obligated to wear a veil, but a particular style of 
hijab began to be promoted as well, via influential propaganda that would be displayed 
throughout the country.  The law was created as “part of the political reconstruction of 
the Islamic social order into an Islamic central society.”19 
 Certain themes have been pervasive through Iranian popular culture regarding the 
wearing of the veil – those of honor, shame and dignity.  The chastity of a woman 
reflected on her husband.  Western clothing and culture were advertised as corrupt and 
immoral.  The religious aspect of the hijab aside, the veil has become a symbol for 
something even more meaningful in Iran.  By being covered in a certain form of hijab, 
the women became a “walking symbol of their pride, piety, [and] national identity to be 
seen as full supporters of their ruling government, the Islamic Republic that ‘freed’ them 
from domination of tyranny of the previous monarchic regime and by its extension, the 
‘infidel colonial’ Western culture.”20  In Iran’s case, the enforcement of hijab is not only 
a matter of religious appropriateness and morality, but nationalism as well. 
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 Saudi Arabia, whose legal system is based on strict Islamic law, rigorously 
enforces hijab on all citizens.  This includes Muslims, as well as expatriate non-Muslims.  
Not only is a headscarf required, but an abaya (a long, black cloak) is incorporated into 
the law and a veil covering the face (with a slit for the eyes) is recommended as well.  All 
clothing must be loose, opaque, and dark in color and should not resemble Western 
apparel.  Violation of the law is punishable in the most extreme form, by death.  In 2004, 
women who appeared unveiled at a conference were warned of “grave consequences” by 
the country’s highest religious authority.21  In Saudi Arabia, the law requiring women to 
wear hijab is very deeply rooted in religion, as well as tradition and custom. 
 
Unveiling 
In the following two chapters, I will use the case studies of France and Turkey to 
illustrate the struggle in integrating non-western culture into western culture.  Other 
European countries are also currently faced with this problem, such as the Netherlands 
(as discussed in the opening chapter) as well as Germany.  In both countries, authorities 
have perceived the headscarf as a challenge to secularism.  As I have mentioned, I have 
chosen to study France and Turkey as they are unique but significant cases in the 
headscarf debate.  Both are secular countries that promote separation of church and state.  
France, while advocating its policy of laïcité, has spearheaded the headscarf ban in 
Europe.  Turkey, a mostly Muslim country, has been struggling with the issue for years as 
it strives to be accepted by the European Union. 
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Historically, Turkey is not the only Muslim country to ban female Islamic dress.  
Since 1981, Tunisia has banned women from wearing the headscarf in schools and 
government buildings.  The secular government viewed the hijab as “sectarian dress” and 
subsequently prohibited it.  More recently, policemen have stopped women in the streets 
to ask them to remove their veils and sign a pledge to discontinue its use.  It is perceived 
as being “worn by people who use religion to hide political aims.”22 
Before going into further detail on my case studies, I will briefly discuss how 
banning the headscarf is a human rights issue. 
 
Human Rights 
Over the years and throughout the various debates surrounding it, one thing is for 
sure: the hijab has become an international symbol of female Muslim identity.  It has 
come to symbolize everything from Islamic fundamentalism, freedom of religious 
expression and women’s subordination to women’s empowerment and equality.23  To 
elaborate further, 
… the hijab is pregnant with meanings acquired during the most recent history of 
contemporary Islamic societies.  A specific style of hijab that a woman may adopt 
can be interpreted in numerous ways.  It might serve as an indication of her 
degree of religiosity or affiliation with or protest against a political party; a cue of 
her progressiveness; a silent communicator of her strong belief in the feminist 
movement; a symbol of her struggle against colonial regime; or it might indicate 
nothing more than her adherence to traditional cultural values.24 
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Irrespective of the exact meaning to a Muslim woman, banning the headscarf may be a 
violation of human rights in that not only is a woman denied her right to religion and 
personal expression, but her sense of autonomy and identity is compromised as well. 
 Based on the articles set forth by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
both equality between men and women and freedom of religion are universally-agreed 
norms.  The Declaration states, “all are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.”25  Regarding freedom of 
religion, the Declaration states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
According to a publication by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of 
Women, religious freedom as a human right means not only being able to choose one’s 
religion and how to practice one’s beliefs, but “it implies freedom from coercion either 
by the State or other religious groups.”26  Furthermore, these values were “framed by 
people from diverse cultures, religions and nationalities and therefore were intended to 
take into account such factors as religion and cultural traditions of countries.  For that 
reason… [there] is no provision whatsoever for differential interpretation based on 
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‘culture or tradition.’”27  Freedom of religion is a fundamental human right granted to all 
individuals. 
For women who veil for religious reasons, the headscarf ban is said to violate 
their freedom of religious expression.  It is understood that religious freedom is not an 
absolute right; the state does have the ability to impose reasonable restrictions on such 
rights for the purpose of regulating a legitimate state interest.  In the case of the hijab, 
however, observers note that there is no justifiable basis or motive to place such 
limitations. 
Headscarves do not pose a threat to public safety, health, order, or morals, and 
they do not impinge on the rights of others. They are not inherently dangerous or 
disruptive of order, and do not undermine the educational function. There may be 
specific circumstances in which state interests justify regulation of religious dress, 
as when such dress would directly jeopardize individual or public health or safety. 
Such concerns, however, cannot justify a blanket prohibition. 28 
Religious freedom, including the freedom to manifest one’s religious beliefs through 
clothing and symbols, is not an absolute right. The state may impose reasonable 
restrictions to regulate a legitimate state interest.29  However, there is no evidence that 
headscarves harm anyone; they are not disruptive or threatening and do not impose on 
others.  It is a personal choice.  Any perceived threat would have to be based on the 
context in which the garment is worn. 
 For example in some cases, women have fought back against veiling by removing 
the headscarf by choice. With the intifada in Gaza, where Hamas had created a “return to 
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moral social code” by nationalizing the hijab to show patriotism, respect and religious 
pride, women used the religious garment as a symbol of rebellion.  They refused to 
conform to the social pressure to wear the veil, despite the sometimes violent 
consequences of doing so. 
Social acquiescence, political inaction, family pressure and a concurrent 
ideological transformation created a situation in which only a few committed 
women in Gaza, one year into the intifada, continued not to wear a headscarf. 
These women were affiliated with the three leftist factions and, although acting 
individually, were all asserting, within the context of the intifada, the fundamental 
linkage between gender liberation and the possibility of a progressive and 
democratic future. Their struggle, then, was not against the hijab itself but about 
what the intifada would lead to… they struggled on a daily basis to maintain their 
right to choose and their right to a better future…30 
The importance of this rebellion is that the women began to fight for their own inherent 
right – the right to choose.  While it was part of a greater political movement, it was key 
in emphasizing their own liberties.  Although this may have been perceived as 
threatening by the authorities, a case can also be made that ultimately, it is the human 
right of the people to revolt and change their institutions at will.31  Only if this rebellion 
was disruptive to state order and stability would there be a question about this right. 
 To reiterate, for women who wear the headscarf for cultural reasons, the ban 
limits their choice, personal expression, and civil liberties.  Freedom of conscience is an 
inalienable human right and is written into western constitutions.  As I have noted, many 
Muslim women living in the West (and East) use the veil as a means of empowerment.  	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To deny a woman the right to decide for herself is unjustifiable, be it in a situation where 
it is forced upon a woman or removed. 
 
 Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that a woman who veils herself is forced to do 
so.  While this may be true in certain cases, many women choose the attire voluntarily. 
Additionally, according to Haleh Chahrokh who studied the ban in Germany for Human 
Rights Watch, “in the light of the state's paramount obligations to protect human rights, 
coercion by the state in banning headscarves is arguably even more serious than coercion 
by private parties in requiring the headscarf. Legitimate efforts to eliminate coercion of 
those who do not wish to wear the headscarf do not justify the state in coercing others not 
to do so.”32  Instead, forced removal of the hijab could aggravate a woman’s situation 
regarding familial pressure and cause further problems. 
 For those who want to wear it for whatever reason, banning the headscarf inhibits 
Muslim women from fully participating in society.  Some women are unwilling to take 
off their hijab, which can take them out of the public sphere and confine them.  Women 
who do comply have to relinquish some of their sense of privacy and comfort.  Both sides 
inhibit public participation, especially in places such as schools and offices, as not being 
able to practice faith freely can surely be debilitating.  Moreover, the headscarf ban in 
schools limits a woman’s access to education.  While it is said to promote communication 
between teachers and pupils, some girls may feel restricted at the thought of removing 
their head-covering.  The subsequent “denial of equal opportunity” that results from the 
ban can have “a long-term effect on future possibilities of economic and political 
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instilled as well as skills that permit persons to compete in the labor force.”33  In 
enforcing the headscarf ban, women’s rights are taken away under the guise of 
modernism, neutrality and advancement. 
 Now that I have provided some background on the significance and 
implementation of the headscarf, I will begin with my first case study: France. 
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Chapter IV: The Headscarf Ban in France 
 
 As mentioned earlier, in order to support my hypothesis, I will use the case 
studies of France and Turkey.  In doing so, I will seek to demonstrate that even when a 
non-western practice (in this case, the headscarf) is seen as threatening by proponents of 
western culture (in this case, French/Turkish policy makers), the denial of civil liberties 
need not occur.  The act of donning the hijab is not harmful in itself to anyone, including 
the wearer.  Why, therefore, would it lead to the denial of rights?  I will first give the 
example of France and will discuss Turkey in the following chapter. 
 Today, Muslims comprise the majority of the immigrant population in Western 
Europe, especially in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and most of all, the 
United Kingdom.  Estimated figures range from 15 to 20 million, comprising 
approximately four to five percent of the total population.1  France has the largest 
proportion of Muslims (seven to ten percent), followed by the Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Italy.2  Host countries continue to try to 
resolve the tension between assimilation and multiculturalism, because immigrants, in 
varying degree, want to retain aspects of their culture. 
 France is arguably the main proponent in the West of a headscarf ban.  While 
citing secularism as its reason, the French government has prohibited the use of the veil 
in public schools.  I will first discuss the nature of French society and then discuss the 
reasons used to ban the scarf. 
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  Robert	  S.	  Leikin,	  “Europe's	  Angry	  Muslims,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  84,	  no.	  4	  (2005):	  122,	  accessed	  on	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  17,	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  Ibid.	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Background: The Nature of French Society 
 Both historically and currently, France is well-known for its policy of 
assimilation.  Dating back to colonial times, French politics have involved establishing a 
national dominant identity for all those governed by France.  By adopting French culture 
and customs, people living in the colonies could embrace this identity. 
The influential and well-educated men [of the colonial era in the mid-eighteenth 
century] believed firmly that that theirs was a modern, industrial society, a 
democratic society, and a superior society in which the ‘higher races’ were 
presumed to have the clear and righteous ‘duty to bring science and industry to 
the inferior races and raise them to a higher level of culture’… By the 1850s, 
France’s infamous policy of assimilation – its ‘civilizing mission’ – in its 
occupied territories was well established, assisted by imposed education 
institutions that endure to this day in parts of North and West Africa and the 
Antilles.3 
This agenda was not only evident in colonial policy, but in the national policy as well, 
where the school, “as an instrument of the state, would assimilate the masses into French 
citizens, as the interests of national unity dictated.”4  Thus, with the establishment of a 
“common culture”, France aimed to promote social cohesion and national unity.  
Previously this policy extended to the colonies, however it currently focuses on ethnic 
minorities living within the country’s borders. 
The headscarf ban in France is directly related to the status of multiculturalism, as 
well as immigration.  With regard to multiculturalism, France does not have a formal 
state policy.  The French Constitution (1958) states that  “France shall be an indivisible, 	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  Tricia	  Danielle	  Keaton,	  Muslim	  Girls	  and	  the	  Other	  France:	  Race,	  Identity	  Politics	  &	  Social	  Exclusion	  (Bloomington,	  Indiana:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  101.	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secular, democratic and social republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before 
the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.”5  It does 
advocate liberty and equality; however, there is essentially no mention of promoting 
cultural diversity. 
In fact, French president Nicholas Sarkozy has publically claimed that 
multiculturalism is a failure and the lack of a national identity can lead to extremism.  
Earlier this year, he remarked in a televised interview: 
Of course we must all respect differences, but we do not want ... a society where 
communities coexist side by side. If you come to France, you accept to melt into a 
single community, which is the national community, and if you do not want to 
accept that, you cannot be welcome in France… We have been too concerned 
about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the 
identity of the country that was receiving him.6 
There is currently a much greater emphasis on assimilation and the adoption of a French 
cultural identity, especially for impressionable young immigrants. 
 Immigration has also been an issue of contention for the state over the past few 
decades.  In the wake of World War II, there was an economic boom in Europe which 
encouraged the influx of migrant workers, especially from the former French colonies 
(North African countries), such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.  By the early 1980s, 
France had approximately 5 million Muslims, comprising almost 10 percent of the 
population and making it the second largest religious group in the country (following 
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  Agence	  France-­‐Presse,	  “Multiculturalism	  'clearly'	  a	  failure:	  Sarkozy,”	  National	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  February	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Roman Catholics).7 However, when economic prosperity declined, tensions rose.  Many 
immigrants faced unemployment and segregation due to forced relocation in the outskirts 
of big towns.  Friction intensified between Muslims and non-Muslims due to the growing 
socioeconomic divide.  The first major incident regarding the headscarf only aggravated 
the situation.8 
 
The Headscarf Ban in France 
 In 1989, three Muslim students were expelled from school for refusing to remove 
their headscarf.  The incident, referred to as the “headscarf affair,” immediately gained 
media attention and initiated the debate in France about the rights of minority groups, 
religious expression in schools, and integration of the immigrant population.9  The 
minister of education, Lionel Jospin asserted the need to respect the “secularity of the 
school” but also noted that “school is made for receiving children and not for excluding 
them.” 10   Although the National Education Council strongly disagreed with his 
assessment, Jospin consulted the Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative court, which 
ruled that the right to wear hijab did not contradict laïcité.  It also stated that there was a 
fundamental right to freedom of expression and religion, but that this freedom 
  … cannot afford students to display signs which by their nature, by the conditions 
under which they would be brought individually or collectively, or by their 
ostentatious character, amounted to an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or 	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  Ellen	  Wiles,	  “Headscarves,	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  Harmonious	  Multicultural	  Society:	  Implications	  of	  the	  French	  Ban	  for	  Interpretations	  of	  Equality,”	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review	  41,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  701,	  accessed	  on	  November	  16,	  2011,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623399.	  8	  Ibid.	  9	  Caitlin	  Killian,	  “The	  Other	  Side	  of	  the	  Veil:	  North	  African	  Women	  in	  France	  Respond	  to	  the	  Headscarf	  Affair,”	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  and	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  17,	  no.	  4	  (2003):	  567,	  accessed	  November	  17,	  2011,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594658.	  10	  Ibid.,	  571.	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propaganda would undermine the dignity or freedom of the student or other 
members of the educational community, jeopardize the health or safety, disrupt 
the conduct of teaching and the educational role of teachers, and finally disturb 
the order in the establishment or normal operation of public service.11 
For the first time in France, there was an issue related to identity that was so controversial 
and in the eyes of critics, toleration of the wearing of the headscarf “represented an 
unacceptable subordination of women.”12  The Muslim community, which was “large in 
number (and in that sense threatening to a French sense of identity), [was perceived as] 
visibly ‘different,’ resentful and discontented,”13 as they requested special concessions 
for students in order to abide by the Muslim faith.  Feminists also joined in the debate, 
injecting “further controversy into an already seething dispute by identifying the 
headscarf issue with an exploitation and domination of vulnerable Muslim girls and 
young women by aggressive males.”14 The headscarf debate was now in the public and in 
the eyes of many French citizens, a challenge to its core principle of secularism.  What 
was originally a “discrete local problem [had] developed into a crisis of French national 
identity.”15  According to Trica Keaton, while the court attempted to rule in accordance 
with the right to freedom of religion, “the ambiguous phrasing of [the court’s] ruling 
made it subject to multiple partisan interpretations that led to the same end: the expulsion 
of girls from schools whose sole crime is to be Muslim and to wish (or be forced) to 
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cover their hair as part of their cultural or religious practices.”16 
 While tensions continued to mount throughout the 1990s, it was not until 2003 that 
the headscarf debate was fully back in the limelight.  With tensions high within the 
Muslim population, the government continued to attribute the problem to the “presence 
of religious symbols (and particularly Muslim headscarves) in schools, in effect judging 
the key social problem to be Muslims' non-acceptance of ‘Frenchness.’”17  In July 2003, 
President Jacques Chirac (of the center-right party, Union for a Popular Party) appointed 
a committee to confront any challenges related to the practice of laïcité.  While the Stasi 
Commission made several recommendations, including the improvement of living 
conditions in some communities, the media only focused on one: “anything that 
compromised the neutral character of the French state in matters of religion must be 
detected and condemned, and offending anomalies removed.” 18    Furthermore, the 
commission cited that French schools were intended to assure “autonomy” and “openness 
to cultural diversity” in the name of gender equality and secularity.  The Commission’s 
report stated that the headscarf did not correspond with this view.19 In March 2004, the 
French parliament voted to decide whether or not to ban religious symbols within the 
public school system.  The ban was subsequently approved with 494 votes to 36, and a 
French law was passed (2004-228) banning religious insignia in government-operated 
primary and secondary schools in France.  The Chirac administration reasserted that the 
decision was about neutrality of the state, “inclusiveness”, and secularism; “every effort 
was, and is being, made to present the new law (effective from September 2004) as 
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neutral and nondiscriminatory, and above all as not being aimed specifically at 
Muslims.”20 However, while it refers to general “conspicuous” religious attire, the law 
has been perceived by the local and international community to be directed towards the 
hijab. 
 The ban was greeted with an immediate public outcry, both domestically and 
internationally.  Even before the ban, there were street protests both in France and 
throughout the Muslim world in cities like Cairo, Tehran, Gaza, Amman and Beirut.  
Since the ban went into effect, the atmosphere within France has remained divided.  
While some agreed that the ban is in line with France’s secular agenda (a majority even 
wanted them banned from streets and other public spaces),21 others felt that it impinged 
on fundamental human rights and was an expression of xenophobia and Islamophobia.  
The French Council of the Muslim Faith, a national elected body set up by the 
government, has opposed the ban, claiming that it questions the loyalty of French 
Muslims.  Members of the opposing socialist party feel that it divides the country, rather 
than serves it.  According to an article in The Economist, while most French people back 
the ban (69 percent), French Muslims are more divided.  A survey in Elle magazine 
found that 49 percent of French Muslim women support it, while 43 percent are against.22  
While most Muslim girls complied and removed their headscarves, approximately 50 
expulsions were handed out in response to students’ refusing to remove their hijab.23  
Some students resorted to home-schooling or enrolled in Roman Catholic schools, as this 	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enabled them to practice religion freely since there is more emphasis on spirituality than 
secularism.  Educators estimate that nearly 10 percent of students in Catholic schools are 
Muslim.24 
 Muslim groups within France and Islamic leaders outside the country have been 
outspoken in their belief that the ban is blatantly directed towards the Islamic community.  
In the international community, there are mixed feelings as well.  Many scholars have 
written books and articles contesting the decision, claiming that it both segregates and 
isolates the Muslim community.  The questions that arise from the debate are numerous. 
How can secularism, which entails freedom of thought and respect for all religions, be the 
reason for denying French Muslim women personal expression as well as liberty of 
conscience?  Does the ban really promote “positive secularism” or is it a step backwards 
in achieving a culturally pluralistic society?  I will discuss these questions and more in an 
attempt to understand the controversy surrounding the hijab. 
 
Arguments: Threat to French Norms of Secularism & Equality 
Liberté, égalité, fraternité. “Liberty, equality, fraternity” is the national motto of 
France.  These three notions originated as the driving principles of the French Revolution 
(1789), when a revolutionary movement of left-wing political groups and the masses 
overthrew an absolute monarchy, a rigid social hierarchy and an aristocracy.  The 
revolution also “dechristianized” France by weakening the immense power of the Roman 
Catholic Church and establishing a separation between church and state.  The Church 
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played a major role in the economic, political and social affairs of the state and thus was 
highly influential in state policies and behavior.  Nationalism and liberalism propelled the 
movement and radically transformed the social, philosophical and political realms.  The 
Enlightenment ideals of equality, citizenship and inalienable rights prevailed and national 
identity was now tied to the state, instead of the monarch.  A document of the Revolution, 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) explained liberty as 
“being able to do anything that does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural 
rights of every man or woman has no bounds other than those that guarantee other 
members of society the enjoyment of these same rights.”25 
Benjamin R. Barber, author of Jihad vs. McWorld, explains the role that 
nationalism played in the Revolution, as it would ultimately lay the foundation for 
France’s current domestic policies. 
Nationalism once helped fashion the states that forged the Enlightenment. As a 
consequence, it gained considerable momentum and a modernizing cachet of its 
own with the rationalistic (if often irrational) revolutions spawned by the 
Enlightenment… The aspiration to a ‘liberal nationalism’ that united the 
cosmopolitan ideals of liberty and equality with the communitarian ideals of 
fraternity and solidarity motivated the Jacobins and the American founders alike, 
and permitted peoples bound by culture and history nonetheless to fashion 
constitutions founded on rights and reason.26 
The ideals of the national motto were written into the French Constitution of the Third 
Republic in 1958; the slogan sets forth for all French people the “common ideal of 
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liberty, equality and fraternity and [was] conceived for the purpose of their democratic 
development.”27  Today, it is an essential component of national French heritage. 
Laïcité (or the separation of Church and State) is another underlying concept of 
the French republic.  It does not involve a simple separation, but the regulation and 
administration of religious practice and institutions by the state.28  Its roots can similarly 
be traced to the French Revolution, with the resulting decline in influence of the Catholic 
Church.  The 1789 Declaration stated, “no one may be disturbed on account of his 
opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not 
interfere with the established Law and Order.”29  In 1905, the Chamber of Deputies 
passed a law to formally introduce a state policy on secularism.  The French law on the 
Separation of the Churches and State states: “the republic assures liberty of conscience.  
It guarantees freedom of worship subject only to the restrictions herein imposed in the 
interests of public order.”30  The 1905 law set forth the human rights of freedom of 
thought and freedom of religion, as well as the neutrality of the state.  Ellen Wiles 
explains the law further: 
Separation of church and state was for a long time only partial; it was not until 
1905 that total secularism was imposed, and any state recognition, funding, or 
endorsement of any religious groups was prohibited; the Code of Education was 
accordingly amended to impose a prohibition on endorsement of any religion in 
state schools. This did not in practice lead to any restriction on religious dress; 
school administrators tolerated schoolchildren wearing a range of symbols from 
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Christian crosses to Jewish kippahs, and no controversy over the matter arose for 
almost a century.31 
That is, until, the headscarf debate.  Today, secularism remains an essential part of the 
French government’s stance and policies.  It “rests on the concept of the universal 
equality of abstract individuals,”32 and is “a foundational value, at the core of French 
uniqueness, and an inspiring model for the entire world.”33  The headscarf ban is example 
of enforcing laïcité. 
 It is clear that for many living in France, the headscarf is viewed as a threat to the 
fabric of French society and the goal to maintain a cohesive, national French identity.  In 
order to be “French,” girls must be unveiled.  In a country that has the largest Muslim 
population in Europe, the headscarf is viewed as a direct challenge to the French 
revolutionary principles of secular education and secular nationalism.  Scholar Harry 
Judge explains: 
To be French is to be Républicain is to be laïque is to be committed to égalité.  
This composite identity has been forged over many centuries, repeatedly 
contested and modified, often imposed from Paris on recalcitrant dissidents, 
transmuted from a monarchical to a constitutional framework, and by the end of 
the last century brought to an apparently stable equilibrium. The maintenance of 
that equilibrium is widely believed to depend on the exclusion of religion from 
the public school, for religion had proved to be inherently and inevitably divisive. 
It follows that éclatement, or any form of fragmentation, is to be deeply feared.34 
 The headscarf also serves as a symbol of a separate issue – the fear of the “other.”  
Islamic scholars assert that both xenophobia and Islamophobia are prevalent throughout 
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western countries, where there is a “biased perception which mainstream societies hold of 
Muslim ethnic communities living in their midst.”35  This was evident in the November 
1989 demonstrations against the “Islamisation of France”, where citizens, responding to 
the “headscarf affair”, protested against the spread of Islam.  The crisis “revealed the 
xenophobia of groups seeking a scapegoat for the economic and social ills of the 
country.”36  For some, the influx of Muslim immigrants and the spread of Islamic norms 
are threatening, as there is a “tendency to view Islam as an intrusion into western culture.  
Muslims tend to be described and interpreted by the West as ‘other,’ ‘non-us,’ or ‘them’ 
with Islam ‘held up as an alien religion against an idealized, unhistorical Judeo-Christian 
mirror… Islam has become a political and social force increasingly impinging upon the 
consciousness of western societies.”37  There is a desire to preserve western culture, 
language and norms.  Additionally, to those opposing the veil, there is a belief that: 
… those who wear the headscarf are not really French and they prefer their 
Muslim (or perhaps even Islamic) identity over their French identity. Thus, the 
headscarf is increasingly seen as the symbol of a foreign people—with a foreign 
religion—who have come to France, but who do not wish to integrate themselves 
fully into French life or accept French values. From this perspective, when the 
French see the headscarf they do not feel pride that their country is tolerant and 
welcoming of other peoples and religions, but rather they feel something foreign 
and non-French has infiltrated their society.38 
The hijab is perceived as a threat to social integration and the maintenance of a French 
identity.  Although proponents of the headscarf ban often discuss unity and “secularism -- 
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a topic connected to political philosophy -- the terms of the debate have been articulated 
in the vocabulary of anthropology, namely, as 'us' and ‘them.’”39  
 According to French law, the state can also limit civil liberties (such as wearing 
religious clothing) when “public order” is being disturbed.40  The Stasi Commission 
viewed the removal of religious clothing in public schools as promoting public order, as 
the headscarf was viewed as causing disorder in French society.  It cites two specific 
reasons for the disorder: (a) the girls were being forced or coerced to veil by their 
families or communities against their will (thus causing sexual discrimination and 
religious polarization within France); and (b) school officials were facing administrative 
difficulties when forced to implement confusing directives in situations of intense 
pressure.41  Additionally, it states, 
For the school community as a whole, the wearing of the veil is too often a source 
of conflicts, of divisions, and even of suffering. The visible character of religious 
insignia is resented by many as contrary to the school’s mission which should be a 
place of neutrality and a place for awakening critical awareness. It is also an 
affront to the principles and values of the school, especially in teaching equality 
between men and women.42 
For the aforementioned reasons, the authorities labeled the headscarf as a threat to public 
disorder.  
 With regard to gender equality, the veil is perceived as a threat to women’s rights 	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and a tool to keep women in submission, thereby harming them.  In its report, the Stasi 
Commission declared that there was a need to “respond to the coercion suffered by 
Muslim girls whose families and communities force them to wear headscarves against 
their will (and because such coercion exacerbates sexual discrimination and religious 
polarization within France).”43  The Commission found that girls were coerced into 
wearing the hijab and it was the government’s obligation to protect them from this 
oppression.  It continues: 
The headscarf is sometimes imposed on pre-adolescent girls by violence. Once 
they have put on the headscarf, they can enter into the staircases of apartment 
buildings and go into the public without fear of being conspicuous, even 
mistreated, as they were when their heads were uncovered. The headscarf thus 
offers, paradoxically, the protection that should have been guaranteed by the 
Republic…  [The girls] appear as the “silent majority”; [as they are] victims of 
pressure imposed by the family or community, the young women need to be 
protected… There are pressures placed on these young minor girls to force them to 
wear religious insignia. The family and social environment imposes a choice on 
them that is not their own. The Republic cannot remain deaf to the cry of distress 
of these young girls. The schools must be for them a place of liberty and 
emancipation.44 
After the ban was implemented, President Nicolas Sarkozy stated: "in our country, we 
cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, 
deprived of all identity.”  This belief is rooted in colonial attitudes that see the veil as 
oppressive: France embarked on a mission to unveil women in Algeria from the early 
twentieth century to the Algerian war of independence in the 1960s.45  At that time, 
Muslim women donned the hijab in defiance of colonialist perspectives.  The veil is not 	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only perceived as threatening to secularism, but to the promotion of women’s rights 
within the country.  For feminist advocates of the ban, the argument “does not distinguish 
between women who are citizens and those who are foreigners—women are subjects of a 
universal discourse of human rights and should be protected, whatever their 
nationality.”46 
 
Arguments Against the Ban: The Matter of Rights 
 While prohibiting the hijab is meant to create a secular, more inclusive society, 
the ban secludes Muslim women and denies them the freedom to practice religion freely.  
Furthermore, it limits freedom of thought and choice, the basic ideals of any democratic 
society.  The ban is said to emancipate Muslim girls, to free them from the overbearing 
pressure to wear the veil.  However, in doing so, the law penalizes those who choose to 
wear it and alienates them further if they get expelled.  It does so with a Western bias that 
does not take cultural relativism into account, as the “policy of banning Muslim women 
from wearing headscarves has in fact been detrimental to the exercise of their rights, 
acting to further exclude them from European societies in the name of supposedly 
universal, but arguably Eurocentric conceptions of women’s rights.”47  It also “goes 
against the traditional role of schools, which is to cultivate future citizens as a means of 
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creating universal subjects.”48  It not only denies girls the right to practice their religion 
freely, but also inhibits their entry to the public school system. 
 For women who wear the veil for non-religious reasons, be it tied to culture, 
identity, community and/or sexuality, the ban denies them the fundamental human right – 
the right to choose.  It restricts their autonomy, and impacts their inherent right to 
“develop and express their own individual identities.”49  While freedom of thought was 
listed as a core tenet of laïcité, the ban denies French girls this right: 
The post-colonial French state refuses to allow women of immigrant origin to be 
subjects in and of themselves—desires and intentions are assumed for them. They 
are presumed to be devoid of reason and unable to make rational choices, perhaps 
even more so than colonial subjects, who were at least considered able to choose, 
even if their choices were not respected.50 
Civil liberties, including the formation and expression of one identity, should be available 
to all citizens of a country, not just those identifying primarily with the dominant identity. 
 The question becomes: Although the headscarf is perceived as threatening, does it 
harm those who wear it, or society at large?  While there are some cases where it is 
forced upon a woman, most women who wear the headscarf choose to do so!  With 
regard to the Stasi Commission’s report, the committee constantly reinforced the 
disruption of public order and the forced veiling upon women.  However, in doing so, it 
failed to provide any sort of actual analysis or acknowledge those who chose to wear the 
headscarf.  Furthermore, it failed to provide an unbiased discussion of other religious 
insignia (such as the Jewish skullcap) or provide any sort of real evidence about coercion 	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or even undue pressure on school officials.51  While the commission stresses the threat 
posed by the presence of headscarves in public schools, it does not provide substantial 
evidence in determining that harm to self or society is involved. 
 In sum, the dilemma emerges out of the tensions associated with multiculturalism.  
In essence, secularism promotes assimilation, rather than the advancement of distinct 
cultural norms and practices.  This begins with the very ideals of the French revolution; 
as Barber notes: 
 The aspiration to dialectic has in this century more often than not been 
contradicted by the reality.  Liberty and fraternity were brother constructs of the 
French revolution, but like Cain and Abel were born to strife.  Embeddedness 
means, if not exactly subjugation to an extended communal identity, membership 
in entities that constrain choice.52  
While secularism is nice in theory – in that it emphasizes equality for all citizens – it was 
implemented in a specific historical context – to protect the French from the domination 
of the Church. 53   The refusal to conform to a secularized identity (and wear 
“ostentatious” religious symbols) is interpreted as disloyal to the Republic.  Also, for 
those who see the headscarf as threatening to France’s founding principles, 
“multiculturalism can only be inherently destructive of the integrity of society, which 
must be only an agglomeration of individual and equal citizens and never degenerate into 
a patchwork of diverse communities.”54 
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Islam is seen as the biggest challenge to France’s secular model in the past 100 
years.55  The integration of non-western norms, such as the hijab, into western culture is 
perceived as threatening; as a result, certain human rights, such as freedom of religion, 
thought, and self-identity, are denied.  While the French authorities make valid claims 
about the importance of laïcité and gender equality, the resulting policy of the headscarf 
ban prevents individuals from experiencing other freedoms guaranteed by western 
culture.  In this case study, there appears to be no visible harm to self or society; 
furthermore, no harm was discernible to women, although feminists and officials claim 
otherwise.  As there is no evidence to prove the headscarf is forced upon a woman, my 
review has found that most women choose to wear the hijab.  It is wrong to assume that 
women are never forced to wear the veil, as I maintain that it is a possibility.  However, 
without any evidence demonstrating this, the denial of human rights is not a justified 
abrogation.   
In the next chapter, I will present the case study of Turkey; while the country has 
a very different history from France, it is facing similar issues in achieving 
multiculturalism. 
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Chapter V: The Headscarf Ban in Turkey 
 
 In this chapter, I will present the case study of Turkey.  Like France, the Republic 
of Turkey was founded with secularism as a main principle.  However, unlike its 
European counterpart,1 Turkey is a primarily Muslim country, with 98 percent of the 
population identifying as Muslims.2  While the predominant culture is western, the 
country had an ancient, non-western cultural history up until it was “modernized” on its 
creation as a republic.  This makes the fact that it has banned the headscarf – and in this 
case, the law extends to public institutions and universities – a very interesting 
comparison. 
 
Background: The Nature of Turkish Society 
 The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire.  For over six centuries, the long-lasting empire included Turkey, and was heavily 
influenced by Islamic culture and institutions.  It was mostly ruled by an absolute 
monarchy, consisting of a sultanate that influenced all political, social, and economic 
affairs of the state. In the aftermath of World War I, the Allied Powers sought to partition 
the empire after its downfall with the Treaty of Sèvres.  However, in 1923, the Turkish 
National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, defeated the Allies in the Turkish 
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War of Independence.  A new government was formed, containing parliamentary, 
democratic, secular, unitary, and constitutional elements. 
 With the creation of the republic, Atatürk implemented drastic changes in the 
government and its respective policies, aiming to transform the newly-formed state into a 
modern, westernized country.  “The abolition of the sultanate and caliphate, introduction 
to secularization, adoption of Western law, liberal capitalism, and industrialization 
became signposts on the road the Turks were told they would travel henceforth."3  
Inspired by the west and its progress, Atatürk radically reformed the policies of the 
previous government, focusing on individual liberties and secularism.  By focusing on 
political and cultural changes, the president hoped Turkey would advance and be 
accepted by Europe.  The 1924 Constitution of Turkey emphasized the democratic and 
secular rights of all Turkish citizens.  With regard to individual liberties, it states: 
All citizens of Turkey are endowed at birth with liberty and full right to the 
enjoyment therefore.  Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without 
offense or injury to others.  The only limitations on liberty – which is one of the 
natural rights of all – are those imposed in the interests of the rights and liberties 
of others.4 
It emphasized “freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech.”5  With regard to religious 
freedom and secularism, it sets forth similar rights as France: 
No one may be molested on account of his religion, his sect, his ritual, or his 
philosophic convictions.  All religious observances shall be free on condition that 
they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public indecency or exist in 
violation of social conventions or the law.6 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3Lois	  Beck	  and	  Nikki	  Keddie,	  Women	  in	  the	  Muslim	  World	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.	  324.	  4	  Constitution	  of	  Turkey	  (1924),	  Article	  68.	  5	  Constitution	  of	  Turkey	  (1924),	  Article	  70.	  6	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  of	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  75.	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While the constitution originally mentioned that the “religion of the Turkish state is 
Islam,” this was later removed (1937) since it violated the secular spirit of the 
constitution. 
Kemalism, or Kemalist ideology developed during the Turkish National 
Movement, consists of “six arrows”: republicanism, nationalism, populism, 
revolutionism, secularism, and statism.  The principle of nationalism “held up a distinctly 
Turkish identity to replace the pan-Islamism of the Ottoman Empire”; secularism 
“justified a far-reaching overhaul in the power of religion in the state,” as Atatürk, 
favoring Western habits and science, abolished religious schools and legalized alcohol.7  
He also established the Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to manage religion and 
religious education, in order to “reorient the Turkish population towards secularist, 
modernist, and nationalist ideals.”8  The constitution, as well as Atatürk’s reforms, were 
in accordance with this Kemalist philosophy.  Turkey’s later constitutions would continue 
to grant such rights to citizens.  The 1961 Constitution of Turkey was even more liberal 
and democratic, specifically outlining many human rights and mentioning “social justice” 
and “human dignity”; it also established a national assembly and senate.  The current 
constitution, created in 1982, has gone through many amendments, but continues to stress 
secular democracy and also the “fundamental rights and freedoms” of the individual. 
 It is important to note that women’s rights and integration were also an integral 
part of state policy, mainly conducted through the deconstruction of the public/private 
divide and the modernization of traditional roles.  Women were granted suffrage and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “'Six	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  of	  Kemalism,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  January	  15,	  1991,	  accessed	  November	  20,	  2011,	  http://articles.latimes.com/1991-­‐01-­‐15/news/wr-­‐324_1_mustafa-­‐kemal-­‐ataturk.	  8	  Anna	  Secor,	  “Islamism,	  Democracy,	  and	  the	  Political	  Production	  of	  the	  Headscarf	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  in	  Turkey,”	  in	  
Geographies	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  Space,	  ed.	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  The	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right to run for domestic and national elections in 1934; girls were to be educated with 
boys, and many began to attend vocational women’s schools and find employment.9  
Women gradually became fully assimilated into society, with more professional women 
in the public space and an emphasis on a “neuter role” (in which sexual identity does not 
interfere with professional identity or behavior) in public occupations.10  In the current 
constitution, Article 10 bans discrimination on the basis of sex, and states: “Men and 
women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality 
exists in practice.”11   
 With regard to Islamic dress, the topic has been one of contention and debate 
since the creation of the republic.  As one of his many reforms that adopted Western law 
and culture, Atatürk immediately encouraged European dress and denounced the 
headscarf, viewing it as an archaic and backwards practice.12  While the headscarf would 
not be officially banned until later (it would be a gradual process), it was discouraged, 
especially for public servants, since it did not coincide with the republic’s laïcité agenda.  
Men were also instructed to westernize their dress, as “not only was the new face of the 
republic a shaven one, but the late Ottoman fez was banned and replaced by the brimmed 
hat in public affairs.”  The Hat Law (1925), along with the Law Relating to Prohibited 
Garments (1934), which mandated modern suits instead of the veil and turban, were 
passed but not strictly enforced.  The abandonment of traditional clothing and the 
elimination of over religious symbols intended to modernize and reconstruct social 
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spaces.  “Through the reorganization of elements of dress, bearing, and manners, the 
Kemalists attempted to create embodied cultural forms that would facilitate the 
inscription of a new Turkish national identity.”13 
 
The Headscarf Ban In Turkey 
 The headscarf ban would be gradually introduced over the years.  This would 
ultimately end with the ban in universities and public institutions, as the government 
progressively increased limitations on religious clothing.  As mentioned, it was shunned 
from the very beginning of the republic’s establishment, as only a move away from 
Ottomanism and Islam would allow for westernization.  By liberating women, the state 
hoped to create a civilized society and solidify a national Turkish identity. 
This line of thinking, which reflected the core constitutional tenet of the founding 
ideology of the new Turkish state, maintained that women’s place and role in 
society are the most significant indicators that Turkey is a modern and civilized 
country, a goal that can be achieved if and only if Turkey distances itself from 
Islam. The image of the modern, Westernized, liberated woman in the public 
sphere, which was attained by the erasure of the mark of Islam—the veil—from the 
body, was a matter of the realization of the foundational cause of the new Turkish 
state toward acquiring a modern and civilized identity.14 
In the 1970s and 1980s, “politics began to bifurcate between parties who sought a 
relaxation of the secularist policies and more militant secularists, and the headscarf was 
used as a symbol in that divide.”15  However, a growing number of students began to don 
headscarves as a political symbol in the Islamic Revival period, “giving a new sort of 	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visibility to Islam in the public sphere, contrary to the secularist norms sanctioned by the 
state.”16  As a result, the government was compelled to change existing dress regulations 
in order to maintain constitutional secularism.  The Regulation Concerning the Dress of 
Students and Staff (1981) extended the regulations to students in schools and the 
Disciplinary Regulation for Students in Higher Education (1985) imposed a mandatory 
punishment for those who did not comply.17  For the next several years, there was much 
confusion as universities, government officers and the Constitutional Court would go 
back and forth on whether or not the hijab was allowed in universities. In February 1997, 
however, the National Security Council classified the headscarf as a threat to national 
security; it declared that it was one of the main indicators of the ‘Islamic threat’ – the 
single most important threat to the well-being and security of the country – and called for 
a ban on the headscarf in all public places.18  The Turkish military issued an ultimatum to 
the government, demanding that the civilian authorities implement and enforce the ban 
without exception.19 
 Since then, the headscarf has remained a sensitive social issue.  Amidst protests 
from Muslim women wanting to wear the hijab and a general concern to provide 
education for all, the Turkish parliament repealed the ban in February 2008, allowing 
women to wear the headscarf in universities.  It also amended the Constitution, 
guaranteeing education and equal treatment from state institutions for all.  In June, the 
Constitutional Court annulled the ban lift, claiming that it was not in line with the state’s 
secular policy.  Currently, the ban has been informally lifted as of September 2010 as the 
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ruling party (Justice and Development Party) has vowed to support any student expelled 
or disciplined for covering her head.20  With the recent rise of the new political party, 
there has been a shift away from liberal secularism and towards more conservative 
government policies; religious freedom is also part of the democratization agenda.  
However, as the law has yet to be formally changed, the country remains in a deadlock on 
the issue. 
 
Arguments for the Ban: Secularism and Potential Political Threat 
The headscarf ban in Turkey has been the source of much conflict since its 
inception in 1980s.  For the past three decades, the struggle between state secularists and 
political Islamists has been tense.  For those supporting the ban, “the resistance to 
headscarves among many secular Turks seems to be driven by something deeper - a 
belief that the rigorous adherence to Islam it symbolizes in the wearer will eventually 
reverse the modernization of Turkish society under its strictly secular system.”21  When 
the ban was being initially questioned in 2008, protestors stormed the streets and carried 
signs stating, “Turkey will not become Iran!”22  Many feared that lifting the ban would 
undermine secularism and bring religion too far into the public sphere; they also worried 
the veil was a symbol of political Islam.  On the other hand, in a country where nearly 73 
percent of women go out with their heads covered,23 many Turkish women, who often 
wear the hijab as a political symbol as opposed to a religious one, have protested the law.  	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  accessed	  November	  21,	  2011,	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Protests, hunger strikes and even legal cases have been prevalent throughout the years.  
Many see the right to wear the veil as a democratic right and religious freedom.  For the 
ruling party, “Turkey has outgrown the headscarf ban.  It is no longer in danger of 
reverting to an Islamic theocracy, as Atatürk feared.”24  In the secular yet predominantly 
Muslim country, the headscarf debate has certainly been heated. 
The controversy in Turkey is directly related to the government’s westernization 
agenda and continued focus on secularism.  A great deal of Turkish policy concerns a 
desire to be western and accepted by Europe.  Over the years, it has become increasingly 
integrated with the West.  It is a member of multilateral institutions such as the Council 
of Europe, North American Treaty (NATO), Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE).  Turkey was one of the founding members of the United Nations and has since 
been actively involved.  However, one of the biggest challenges facing Turkey is its 
accession to the European Union.  While it is currently in full membership negotiations, it 
has been adjusting its national and foreign policy since first applying for full membership 
in 1987.  It has been an associate member of the European Economic Community since 
1963 and signed a customs union agreement with the European Union in 1995. However, 
the road to attaining accession has been a difficult one. 
With regard to the headscarf debate, the European Union claims to have a neutral 
stance, as there is no common implementation among its members.  The EU Enlargement 
Commissioner has also stated that the European Court of Human Rights leaves the 
headscarf decision to the countries.  In 2004, however, the Court rejected an appeal by a 
Turkish woman who was barred entry from her university.  A few years earlier, Leyla 	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Şahin was denied entrance into lectures and examinations on multiple cases.  The 
following year (1998), she filed an application with the European Commission for 
Human Rights under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, claiming that the headscarf ban in higher education 
institutions violates her right to privacy (Article 8), freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (Article 9), freedom of expression (Article 10) and freedom from discrimination 
(Article 14) of the Convention and freedom of education (Article 2) of its Protocol No. 
1. 25  In June 2004, the seven-judge chamber European Court of Human Rights 
unanimously ruled against Şahin‘s appeal, justifying the headscarf ban in the name of 
secularism and as “necessary in a democratic society.”  Furthermore, it stated that “the 
court did not lose sight of the fact that there were extremist political movements in 
Turkey which sought to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and 
conception of a society founded on religious precepts”.26  Interestingly enough, while 
Şahin’s veil-wearing did not threaten public order or the liberty of others, the European 
Court of Human Rights decided it was not in accordance with Turkey’s principle of 
secularism. 
 The headscarf ban in Turkey, as demonstrated by the Şahin v. Turkey ruling,  
“suggests that the Islamic headscarf is no longer simply considered a religious [or 
cultural] symbol but is increasingly perceived as a political symbol that has, in and of 
itself, negative implications for public order and individual freedom in a democratic 
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society.”27  Like France, the headscarf, a non-western norm, is viewed as a threat to 
laïcité.  It is also seen as a political threat, as it has been associated with fundamental 
Islam since the creation of the republic.  According to Wiles, “it is an oversimplification 
to argue that the headscarf is an indicator of a polarizing opposition between Islamists 
threatening a reversion to Islamic law and reasonable secularists seeking to retain a 
secular democracy and legal system.”28  The Şahin case was just one of many cases 
brought about by women fighting to wear the hijab for various cultural, religious or 
political reasons; in not one of the cases was harm evident, especially in the form of a 
political Islamic threat. 
 The headscarf is perceived as threatening to a national Turkish identity, which 
Atatürk worked laboriously to create and the Turkish government has tried to preserve. 
 Turkish ‘nationalism’ is most typically expressed in terms indicating a desire to 
be a part of the ‘modern,’ secular, European- dominated international system, 
whether economic, political, cultural, or social.  In contrast, ‘Muslim identity’ is 
sometimes expressed with references to membership in the ‘Muslim World,’ in 
the use of Arabicas the sacred language for Muslims of all nationalities, and even 
in the adoption of ‘traditional Muslim’ symbols – like headscarves – that have 
come into cross-national use but that had not previously been an integral part of 
Turkish Muslim practice.29 
In an effort to veer away from the Ottoman Muslim identity of the former empire, 
Kemalists sought to establish an entirely new, separate Turkish identity that promoted 
western ideals and culture. 
 However, unlike France, it is also viewed as a threat to westernization and 
European integration, as Turkey has been tailoring its policies for over two decades in 	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order to be accepted by the European Union.  Wiles elaborates further, “another clear 
concern is that Turkey is seeking to demonstrate it is serious about reducing the systemic 
oppression of women in its society in order to further its bid to join the EU, and the 
headscarf can be used as a symbolic means of demonstrating a commitment to gender 
equality.”30  In an effort to gain accession, the state attempts to reinforce its commitment 
to secularism and women’s rights with the enforcement of the ban.  It is assumed that the 
hijab does not promote gender equality, but inhibits a woman’s freedom and status, along 
with the progress of the nation.  The headscarf debate is a complex matter for the EU-
focused, Muslim-majority country. 
 
Arguments Against the Ban: A Matter of Rights 
 With regard to human rights, Turkey has signed various international treaties.  
Not only is the protection of human rights high on the European Union’s criteria, but 
Turkey has signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 
which places it under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.  While 
there appears to be confusion among European Union member-states about whether the 
headscarf ban is a violation of human rights, I will again illustrate how it is an abrogation 
of human rights. 
In Turkey, veiled women cannot enter courts, government buildings and offices, 
schools and universities.  For those who wear the hijab, which is two-thirds of the 
population, this is certainly restricting.  For those who wear it for religious reasons, it 	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denies them the freedom of religious expression.  For those who wear it for cultural or 
political reasons, which appears to be the case for a majority of Turkish women, it strips 
away freedom of thought and conscience, as well as the right to choose for oneself.  In 
fact, a March 2008 study of 1,500 Turkish students in 26 universities determined that 52 
percent of respondents were not in favor of the ban,31 demonstrating the lack of support 
of the ban among Turkish women. 
More than it does in France, the headscarf ban in Turkey denies women the right 
to education.  Although France has banned the hijab in public primary and secondary 
schools, Turkey extended the rule to public schools and all universities.  While some 
women resort to wearing a cap or wig, or even studying abroad, others are excluded from 
schools and universities.  According to the nongovernmental organization Mazlumder 
(Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), since the ban was 
enforced, more than 10,000 women in Istanbul alone have been excluded from 
universities.32  Another statistic from AKDER (Organization for Women’s Rights of Non-
Discrimination) estimated that between 2000 and 2007, approximately 270,000 of the 
677,000 students expelled from post-secondary institutions were "victims of the ban.”33 
Even within a population that mostly identifies with the same religion, the 
headscarf ban creates a divide among those who support the ban and those in favor of it.  
It established an “us” versus “them” dichotomy on a social level and excludes the 
“other,” or women who want to wear the headscarf.  Furthermore, “the headscarf has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Immigration	  and	  Refugee	  Board	  of	  Canada,	  “Turkey:	  Situation	  of	  women	  who	  wear	  headscarves,”	  May	  20,	  2008,	  accessed	  November	  20,	  1011,	  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4885a91a8.html.	  32	  Tabitha	  Morgan,	  “Scarf	  conundrum	  grips	  Turkey,”	  BBC	  News,	  February	  25,	  2005,	  accessed	  November	  28,	  2011,	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513259.stm.	  33	  Immigration	  and	  Refugee	  Board	  of	  Canada,	  “Turkey:	  Situation	  of	  women	  who	  wear	  headscarves,”	  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4885a91a8.html.	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become a point of capture, a site of intensity, for the ongoing negotiation of powerful and 
competing ideologies circulating in Turkish society,” as it plays with Islamist, secularist 
and democratic discourses.34  The headscarf issue has permeated Turkish society and is a 
multi-dimensional problem debated by Islamists, laïcité proponents, human rights 
activists and more. 
 In Turkey, the headscarf controversy represents the difficulty of peacefully 
integrating non-western culture, even in its mildest form, into western culture.  The 
presence of the headscarf is seen as threatening to the founding principles the Turkish 
government has worked to protect, including secularism and a society devoid of Islamic 
fundamentalism.   As a result, there is a denial of human rights in various forms.  While 
like any predominantly Muslim country Turkey is prone to elements of political Islam, it 
is a gross oversimplification to tie the hijab to the rise of an extreme form of Islamic 
culture that is harmful to society.  Is there not potential threat regarding fundamentalism 
with any other religions?  Furthermore, is the headscarf representative of harm in and of 
itself?  I argue that while in Turkey the headscarf is more of a cultural and political 
symbol, this is a reaction to the government’s policy to keep religion entirely out of the 
public sphere.  It is linked not only to cultural tradition, but also serves to express the 
right to dress in accordance with one’s personal identity. 
In the next chapter, the conclusion, I will discuss my findings and the status of my 
hypothesis. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Secor,	  “Islamism,	  Democracy,	  and	  the	  Political	  Production	  of	  the	  Headscarf	  Issue	  in	  Turkey,”	  210-­‐211.	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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
 Before summarizing my findings, I would like to take a minute to reiterate my 
original hypothesis:  Even though under certain circumstances non-western culture can 
be seen as threatening to western culture, this should not serve as a pretext for the 
abrogation of human rights, except in situations where the non-western culture can bring 
harm to self or others. 
 In order to defend my hypothesis, I used the current headscarf debate in France 
and Turkey.  The headscarf, representative of non-western culture in its mildest form, is 
often perceived as threatening to western culture.  As a result, both states have banned the 
hijab in public institutions.  I have maintained that this should not serve as a pretext for 
the denial of human rights because for the most part, the headscarf is not harmful to the 
individual or the liberties of others.  It holds religious and/or cultural significance for 
many veiled women, and denying them the choice to decide for themselves inhibits their 
basic civil liberties and individualism – the basic tenets of western culture.  In France, 
although the government claimed secularism and gender equality were being threatened, 
there was no evidence to indicate that any harm was involved.  Turkish authorities 
embrace secularism as part of their westernization agenda, and also associate the hijab 
with political Islam.  The donning of the veil appears to be more of a political act 
associated with identity politics, rather than fundamentalist political ideology.  In my case 
studies, I discussed why the headscarf is deemed threatening; now, I would like to briefly 
elaborate on the broader conflict between Islam and the West. 
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 While conflict with Islam has existed since the colonial era, the world-changing 
events of 9/11 thrust Islam into the limelight.  Not only were western countries faced with 
a new national security concern, but they were also now faced with a “foreign” culture 
with which they had little familiarity.  As a result, patriotism sprung up throughout 
western societies, demonstrated by the display of country flags and unwavering support 
for the troops fighting the “war on terror.”  However, along with patriotism, came 
steadfast nationalism and a sense of superiority about the western way of life.  As Tebble 
notes, “particularly since 9/11 nationalist political movements and parties that address 
issues of identity and culture have grown in strength in many Western liberal 
democracies… it would take only another major geopolitical event to tip the balance of 
popular rather than fringe opinion still further in nationalism’s favor.”1  Nationalism and 
a strong accompanying identity can overwhelm smaller groups and impose on their way 
of life. 
 A great deal of the apprehension towards Islam has its roots in colonialist 
attitudes.  At the end of the nineteenth century, when Europe attempted to extend its 
power and hegemony into the Middle East, it was faced with non-western culture that it 
viewed as “barbaric.”   
In the Middle East, the treatment of women provided Europeans with an excuse to 
declare the inferiority of Muslims and their religion, and also justification of 
Europe’s imperialist and colonialist policies and practices.  Many popular and 
scholarly articles portrayed Muslim women as one of two extremes: as voluptuous 
objects of desire, surrounded by servants and slaves, or as abject and submissive 
victims at the mercy of tyrannical husbands and fathers…2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Adam	  James	  Tebble,	  “Exclusion	  for	  Democracy,”	  Political	  Theory	  34,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  464+466-­‐467,	  accessed	  November	  2,	  2011,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452475.	  2	  Walther,	  Women	  in	  Islam,	  7-­‐8.	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European culture, traditions and norms were glorified, while Islamic culture was labeled 
as uncivilized. 
There are also elements of xenophobia and Islamophobia that have been prevalent 
since the rise of European imperialism, but that have been exacerbated following the 
terrorist attacks.  In Orientalism, Edward Said presents his interpretation of Western 
attitudes towards Middle Eastern/Islamic cultures, or the Orient.  He explains that a major 
component of European culture is that European identity is superior, and that there is a 
“hegemony of European ideas about the Orient… reiterating European superiority over 
Oriental backwardness.”3  While western culture is viewed as modern and progressive, 
Islamic culture is believed to be archaic and backwards.  This perspective was evident in 
the review of France and Turkish policy-making.  Furthermore, the lack of knowledge 
about Islam leads to negative assumptions and fear.  Said states, 
Islam is rarely studied, rarely researched, rarely known… [It] has been 
fundamentally misrepresented in the West – the real issue is whether indeed there 
can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, 
because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in 
the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.4 
As it is foreign and categorized as “other,” there is a lack of understanding about the 
culture and there is often a projection of a state or individual’s interpretation. According 
to Said’s theory, herein lies the root of xenophobia and Islamophobia.  As Islamic culture 
is unfamiliar, there is a fear of what is strange and foreign, along with a fear of the spread 
of Islam.  In today’s day and age, Islam is feared more so as a political ideology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Edward	  Said,	  Orientalism	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1978),	  7.	  4Ibid.,	  300+272.	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Having developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the current 
Islamophobia arose out of geopolitics and migration that brought millions of Muslims to 
Europe.  Matti Bunzl explains that while religion and race are aspects of Islamophobia, 
these are not essential parts of the debate. 
What does stand at the heart of Islamophobic discourse is the question of 
civilization, the notion that Islam engenders a worldview that is fundamentally 
incompatible with and inferior to Western culture. As a result, Islamophobic 
claims are actually quite different from those of modern anti-Semitism. Whereas 
anti-Semites questioned Jews’ fitness for inclusion in the national community, 
Islamophobes are not particularly worried whether Muslims can be good 
Germans, Italians, or Danes. Rather, they question whether Muslims can be good 
Europeans. Islamophobia, in other words, functions less in the interest of national 
purification than as a means of fortifying Europe.5 
Islamophobia serves as an exclusionary tactic that singles out the “other” and seeks to 
protect what is “European.”  Interestingly enough, while Turkey has been desperately 
trying to be accepted by Europe, Islamophobia is evident in the disapproval of their 
membership by member-states.  While the leaders of some countries have been 
supportive, others, belonging to a very vocal group, feel that “no issue is more troubling 
than Turkey’s Muslim character, the country’s long tradition of secularism 
notwithstanding.”6  One such detractor, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former president of 
France and head of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the body charged with 
drafting a European constitution, “has likened Turkey’s possible entry into the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Matti	  Bunzl,	  “Between	  anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  Islamophobia:	  Some	  thoughts	  on	  the	  new	  Europe,”	  
American	  Ethnologist	  32,	  no.	  4	  (2005):	  502,	  accessed	  November	  30,	  2011,	  doi:	  10.1525/ae.2005.32.4.499.	  6	  Ibid.,	  505.	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Union to the end of Europe.”7  The accession of a Muslim country is seen as highly 
threatening to the fabric of Europe. 
 Among others, the aforementioned attitudes contribute to the current state of 
affairs and the clash of civilizations.  However, regardless of these perspectives, it is also 
a western norm that there is no justification for the abrogation of human rights when 
harm is not involved.  As human beings, we must respect one another in both the public 
and private spheres.  Philosopher Immanuel Kant speaks about respect for the person, or 
the respect that is morally and unconditionally required for all individuals because they 
are free rational beings that possess unconditional dignity.  Dignity is independent of all 
other facts and has absolute and incomparable worth.  As individuals are rational beings, 
there is a limit on how others may treat them; 
In particular, they must never be treated merely as means, as things that we may 
use however we want in order to advance our interests, and they must always be 
treated as the supremely valuable beings that they are… To respect persons is thus 
to regard them as absolutely, unconditionally, and incomparably valuable, to 
value them in themselves and not just in comparison to others or insofar as they 
are valuable to someone or could be useful as a means for furthering some 
purpose, and to acknowledge in a practical way that their dignity imposes 
absolute constraints on our treatment of them.8 
It is essential to respect people and their free will, especially when exercising their 
fundamental rights does not cause harm to themselves or others. 
 In order to have a truly multicultural world, we must respect the identities and 
civil liberties of various groups; establishing an overwhelming national identity or 
abrogating human rights is not acceptable.  While there is a need to balance diversity and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Ibid.	  8	  Robin	  S.	  Dillon,	  "Respect,"	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (2010),	  ed.	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta,	  accessed	  November	  30,	  2011,	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/respect.	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universal values, an individual’s free will must not be compromised.  In examining the 
relationship between individual rights and the power of the state, we unveil the 
challenges in achieving multiculturalism in secularist societies.  Hopefully, with time and 
continued efforts, Europe can work towards achieving increasingly multiculturalist 
communities where ethnic identities can thrive and prosper. 
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